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APPENDIX 1.  TERMS OF REFERENCE 
Subject: 
1.  Context 
Regulatory and legal issues associated with the creation of a regulatory 
authority for telecommunications at the level of the Union 
The Commission is currently preparing proposals for the regulatory framework governing 
the telecommunications industry for the time when the liberalisation process will have been 
completed.  From the institutional perspective, this requires definition of the respective roles 
for national and Union regulatory authorities. 
In addition, many industry participants have identified the need to streamline enforcement 
of the regulatory framework and called for an authority at European level The Report on 
"Europe and the global information society" ("Bangemann Group Report") argued for such 
an authority, without however seeking to define its remit. 
2.  Backgroundtothestttdy 
The future organisational structure for regulation of telecommunications in the EU must 
balance various policy objectives, which will form a set of benchmarks against which to 
judge any future regulatory environment: 
•  Any future structure should enable effective supervision of the telecommunications 
industry  and  ensure  a  consistent  and  efficient  application  of  the  regulatory 
framework.  This will involve striking an appropriate balance between what should 
be done at a European level and what is best left to national regulatory supervision. 
This balance may well vary in different policy areas, such as the application of 
competition rules, frequency policy or licensing of infrastructure and services. 
•  Any future structure should facilitate the development of pan-European services and 
networks, as well as the trend towards convergence of different technologies and 
markets. 
•  Any  future  structure  will  have  to  take  account  of the  present framework  for 
regulatory  cooperation  between  national  regulatory  authorities  on  a  European 
(CEPT) and worldwide (1TU) scale. 
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3.  Requirements 
In the light of these considerations, the study will examine regulatory and legal issues 
associated with the creation and operation of a regulatory authority at a European level. 
The study will in particular focus on: 
3.1  Identification of  current issues which would best be dealt with a European level 
•  The study should identify what are considered by market players to be the current or 
emerging core regulatory issues which would best be dealt with at a European rather 
than a national level.  This might address issues such as: 
licensing  and  resource  management  (including  fixed  and  radio-based 
infrastructure, frequency and numbering issues); 
issues resulting from divergent licence conditions and styles of regulation; 
interconnection issues; 
cooperation and restructuring within the telecommunications industry and 
between telecoms and other industries. 
3.2  Analysis of  the potential operational problems which might result from  the existence of split 
regulatory responsibilities and recommendations to overcome these problems 
•  The Study should consider in the light of the survey, and of experience in other 
jurisdictions,  the  practical  and  operational  problems  which  could  result  from 
splitting  of regulatory  responsibilities  between a  European level  authority  and 
national and/  or pan-European bodies.  Whilst focusing on the telecommunications 
sector illustrations from other relevant sectors might be considered. 
•  The Study should also consider potential problems resulting from different levels of 
regulatory supervision for  different parts of the Information Society, as well as 
possible approaches to overcome this.  One example, could be the situation where 
the licensing conditions for  pan-European new telecommunications services was 
supervised  at  a  European  level,  whilst  content  related  issues  linked  to  cable 
television continued to be regulated at a national level. 
The Commission has already launched a study on current regulatory structures in some of 
the main telecommunications markets outside the Union, viz. the United States, Canada and 
Australia.  The results of that study may be useful in addressing the issues of a possible 
European level authority, given the federal structure in those countries. 
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3.3  The legal issues surrounding the creation of  such an authority 
•  The legal basis for such a regulatory authority, both under the existing EC Treaty 
and in  the  perspective  of  possible  changes  to  this  Treaty  following  the  1996 
intergovernmental conference. 
•  The activities which under those legal bases could be delegated to the authority and 
whether current legal structures would allow  such delegation?  What regulatory 
tasks must legally be retained by the Commission, and what activities could usefully 
be carried out either by national regulators or by non-Union bodies at a European 
level? 
•  In the light of these legal considerations recommendations for possible approaches 
to overcome the barriers and issues identified in parts 3.1 and 3.2. 
This legal analysis should be undertaken in the light of the general principles of Community 
law, including subsidiarity and proportionality.  Account should also  be taken of the 
relationship  of  any  regulatory  authority  at a  European  level  with  other  Community 
institutions, with Member States' regulatory authorities and with international bodies in the 
telecommunications area 
The  study is likely  to  be carried out by a  firm or consortium of firms  with extensive 
regulatory and legal expertise, in particular in the telecommunications sector but not limited 
to that sector.  The contractor should have confirmed experience of regulatory work at the 
level of the Union, in at least some of the Member States, and ideally also in some of the 
main jurisdictions outside the Union. 
4.  Conclusions 
The study should draw conclusions from the analysis and present the legal issues which are 
likely  to  arise if a  regulatory authority at European level were to be instituted for  the 
telecommunications area.  The study could also identity the various tasks which could be 
entrusted to such an authority and any particular issues associated with some of these tasks. 
The study is not intended to make recommendations on the merits of whether or not such 
an authority  at a  European  level  should be  created  as  a  matter  of  policy,  but may 
recommend  particular  approaches  to  be  followed  if such  an  authority  were  to  be 
established;  such  recommendations  might  suggest  different  approaches  for  different 
regulatory issues.  The Study is not intended to review existing policy lines followed by the 
European Union, nor to comment on their merits. 
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APPENDIX 2.  INTERVIEWS 
Austria 
Dr. Singer, Ministry of Transport and Science. 
Robert Springer, IBM Austria. 
Ernst Strommer, Austrian Railroads. 
Michael Sprinzl, Division for Transportation and Telecommunications Policy, Employers 
Association. 
France 
C. Hacker, Charge du bureau des affaires economiques et reglementaires/ Affaires 
europeennes et  multilaterales, France Telecom. 
M. Louvet, Reglementation des Reseaux, France Telecom. 
J  .M. Linois, Chef du Service des Affaires Intemationales, DGPT. 
S. Petroff, Telecom Development Manager, Eurotunnel. 
G. Chauveau, Charge de Mission, SIRIS. 
R. Deshayes, IT Manager, Credit Lyonnais. 
Germany 
Bernhard Spohr, Division Head, Regulatory Affairs, Deutsche Telekom. 
Mr. Sanders, Deputy Head, Policy Issues, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 
Dr. Karl-Heinz Neumann, Director of Regulatory Affairs, RWE Telliance. 
Dr. Karl-Heinz Strache, Mannesmann Mobilfunk GMBH 
Dr. Thomas Ehrmann, Vebacom. 
Dr. Thomas Mellewigt, Vebacom. 
Greece 
Mr. G. Skarpelis, General Director, Telecommunications Networks, OTE S.A. 
Mr A. Lambrinopoulos, President, National Telecommunications Committee. 
Mr. N. Manasis, Business Development Manager, Panafon Hellenic Telecommunications 
Company S.A.  Also, Chairman of the GSM European Interest Group and Vice Chairman of 
the GSM MoU Association. 
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Dr. P. Tzortazakis, Managing Director, FORTHnet S.A. 
Mr. V. G. Cassapoglou, Advocate, Secretary General, Hellenic Telecoms Users Association. 
Italy 
Claudio Boreggi, Vice-Director for Strategy, Planning and Control, Telecom Italia SpA. 
Romano Righetti, Director-General, Directorate for Regulation and Service Quality, Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunications. 
Michele Concina, President and CEO, Albacom SpA. 
Bruno Lamborghini, Senior Vice President, Olivetti-Telemedia Group. 
Roberto Pesce, Head, Telecommunications Services, Fiat SpA. 
Netherlands 
Hans Kraaijenbrink, Director of European Policy and Regulation, PIT Telecom. 
Fokko Bos, Deputy Head, International Policy Division, Policy Affairs Directorate, Ministry 
of Transport. 
L. Titre, Technological Policy Division, Policy Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Transport. 
J. Broere, Frequency Management, Policy Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Transport. 
David Reibel, General Counsel in Charge of Legal Aspects, Esprit Telecom. 
Frans Lijnkamp, Regulatory Counsel, Unisource. 
B. de Ruiter, Vice President Government & Intercompany Relations, Unisource. 
Hein Albeda, Policy Officer, ConsumentenBond. 
A. de Liefde, Director, BTG. 
Spain 
Jose-Alberto Blanco Losada, Subdirector General of Strategic Planning, Telef6nica de 
Espana, S.A. 
Enrique Carrascal Gonzalez, Subdirector of Access Networks Department of Network and 
Service Planning, Telef6nica de Espana, S.A. 
Maria Nieves Tapiador, Telef6nica de Espana. 
Pedro L. Alonso Manj6n, Chief of Support  Staff to the Director General, Direcci6n General 
de Telecomunicaciones. 
Ignacio Menendez de Luarca, Director of Business Development, Retevisi6n. 
Jose Ram6n Fernandez Antonio, Director of Planning and Finance, Retevisi6n. 
Jose Maria Sobrino las Heras, Director of Plans and Studies, Retevisi6n. 
Carlos L6pez Blanco, Secretary to the Board and Head of Legal Affairs, Airtel M6vil, S.A. 
6 Victor Gonzalez Munoz, Assistant to the President, Airtel M6vil, S.A. 
Luis Camarena Checa, Director of Marketing, BT Telecomunicaciones. 
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Antonio Uobet, Assistant Director General, Asociaci6n Espanola de Usuarios de 
Telecomunicaciones (Autel). 
Bruno Soria, Technical Director, Asociaci6n Espanola de Usuarios de Telecomunicaciones 
(Autel). 
Sweden 
Oaes-Goran Sundelius, Director, National Regulatory Affairs, Telia. 
Johan Martin-Lof, Director International Affairs, Telia. 
Curt Andersson, Deputy Director General- Director of Licensing and International Affairs, 
Post & Telestyrelsen -National Post and Telecom Agency. 
Anders Frederich, Head of Section, Coordination, Post & Telestyrelsen -National Post and 
Telecoms Agency. 
Ola Silberman, Company Lawyer, Tele2. 
Jorgen Nilsson, Manager, Business Strategy, Tele 2. 
Alan Wright, Business Development Manager, France Telecom Nordphone AB. 
United Kingdom 
Larry Stone, Head of EU Affairs & European Regulation, British Telecommunications. 
Fiona Hope, Senior Adviser, European Regulation, British Telecommunications. 
Caroline Varley, Director of Services Competition and International Affairs, Oftel. 
Andre Sheehan-Evett, European Regulatory Officer, International Section, Oftel. 
Julian Farrel, Communications and Information Industries Division, Department of Trade 
and Industry. 
Christopher Holmes, Communications and Information Industries Division, Department qf 
Trade and Industry. 
Mike Dodds, European Telecommunications Section, Communications and Information 
Industries Division, Department of Trade and Industry. 
Gareth Locksley, Mercury and Cable & Wireless Europe. 
John Saxton, Martin Dawes. 
Other survey respondents 
Nick White, Vice Chairman, INTUG. 
Mel Read, Member of the European Parliament. 
Hartmut Seibel, Regulatory and Legal Counsel, Hermes Europe Railtel. 
./ 
7 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority  n;e;r;a 
Otto Bjorklund, Head of Representative Office, Nokia. 
Marcel de Sutter, Secretary General, Association of Private European Cable Operators 
(APEC). 
Fact finding interviews 
Yves Mongelard, Deputy Head of Office, European Radiocommunications Office (ERO). 
Jean-Yves Montfort, European Telecommunications Office (ETO). 
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APPENDIX3.  BRIEFING NOTE FOR INTERVIEWERS 
1.  Purpose of Briefing Note 
The purpose of this note is to provide guidance to those people undertaking interviews as 
part of the study of the issues associated with the creation of a  European Regulatory 
Authority.  In particular, we need to ensure that the output of the interview process is 
precisely geared to the objectives of the study, as related to us by DG XIII.  It is important, 
therefore,  that  all  interviewers  read  this  note  when  conducting  their  programme  of 
interviews. 
2.  Background 
The European Commission has emphasised that the interviewers need to obtain as much 
hard evidence and as many reasoned arguments as possible so as to enable the prospective 
benefits (advantages) and costs (disadvantages) associated with a pan-European regulator 
to be assessed.  To produce the requisite information, it will be necessary for interviewers to 
ask penetrating questions and to probe interviewees' responses, in addition to collecting any 
relevant supporting material.  This is tum means that interviewers will need to ensure that 
they have thought in advance about the potential implications of the creation of a  pan-
European regulator, including its role vis-a-vis national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and 
existing European bodies, and have an understanding of what the major issues are in each 
of the areas covered by the questionnaire. 
To help in this process, we have: 
•  attached the terms of reference of the study; 
•  attached a note from Denton Hall, which summarises the nature and activities of 
existing European telecommunications organisations; 
•  briefly discussed, in a  later section of this note, some of the main issues which 
appear to us to be relevant.  Interviewees are, however, encouraged to go beyond 
our list and to identify any additional issues which they regard as being relevant. 
What the Commission does not want is a litany of complaints about NRAs, and their lack of 
independence, with the concomitant conclusion that a pan-European regulator is required 
in order to perform the role of regulator of the regulatorst.  The primary objective of this 
We already have plenty of evidence about the lack of regulatory independence at present, and the slow or absent 
implementation of particular regulatory measures in certain Member States (from the ONP study).  It is also 
important to note that EU measures to increase regulatory independence are imminent (see footnote 3).  Any use 
of a pan-European body to improve the performance of NRAs would have to be shown to be necessary and to 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity. These issues can be considered in the report, but we do not want the 
interviews to be a conduit for complaints about the general capabilities of NRAs. 
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study is to examine the case for creating a pan-European authority, assuming that NRAs 
will become both independent and effective. 
We have therefore defined the regulatory framework which can be expected to exist in the 
absence of a  pan-European regulatory authority.  This provides the benchmark against 
which the benefits of creating such an authority need to be  assessed.  The regulatory 
framework in the absence of a pan-European regulator is assumed to have the following 
elements: 
•  the NRA in each Member State is independent and effective.  Thus, the case for a 
pan-European regulator does not rest on the fact that, at present, NRAs in many 
countries are not independent2; 
•  existing European bodies perform many of the functions which might be undertaken 
by a pan-European regulator.  In particular, the following bodies need to be borne in 
mind when considering the potential role of a pan-European regulator: 
the European Commission and the ONP Committee; 
the European Committee of Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs (ECI'RA), 
which provides a  forum within which major  telecommunications  regulatory 
policy issues can be defined, individual NRAs can exchange views and share 
experiences regarding regulatory implementation, and common agreement can 
be reached on the principles of regulation; 
the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI)  which  has 
responsibilities for designing standards; 
the European Telecommunications Office (ETO) which was set up to consider the 
technical aspects of licence harmonisation and plays an important role in the area 
of numbering policy; 
the European Radiocommunications Office  (ERO)  which is involved in radio 
frequency harmonisation; 
the  proposed  European  Union  Telecommunications  Committee  (EUTC), 
consisting  of  representatives  from  Member  States  and  chaired  by  the 
Commission, which has limited dispute resolution powers in respect of licensing 
questions; 
•  bilateral  negotiations  between  Member  States,  e.g.  on international  accounting 
settlements. 
2  The Commission has recently presented a proposal for amending the ONP Framework Directive (90/387  /EEC). 
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Put succinctly,  the purpose of the study is  to identify whether the creation of a  pan-
European regulator would lead to net benefits (after taking account of the costs involved) 
compared to  a  framework  which consists  solely  of a  combination of independent and 
effective NRAs, existing telecommunications institutions which operate at a pan-European 
level, and bilateral negotiations between  ·Member-States. 
3.  Potential Role for a Pan-European Regulator 
The  central  question  to  be addressed  is  what would  the  creation  of a  pan-European 
regulator offer that can not readily be provided by the framework defined above?  Bearing 
in mind that the regulatory framework will need to cope with the increasing globalisation of 
telecommunications  companies  and  the  prospective  development  of  trans-European 
networks  (TENS),  it would appear that such an authority might have a  role to play in 
relation to: 
•  operation  of  networks  and  the  provision  of  services  that  transcend  national 
boundaries; 
•  interconnection of networks in different countries; 
•  coordination of the use of scarce resources (numbers and radio frequencies) in order 
to facilitate service provision and inter-operability at a European level; 
•  ensuring that regulatory  principles and practices  are sufficiently  harm.onised  to 
prevent the emergence of regulatory "havens" and opportunities for companies to 
exploit differences between countries in regulatory conditions; 
•  resolution of disputes between entities in different Member States. 
It will be necessary, as part of this study, to identify the potential importance of each of 
these possible roles for a pan-European body, and hence the potential benefits.  Equally, it 
will be necessary to consider the problems and costs, which might arise from the creation of 
such a body, and their potential importance.  A view will also be necessary on the extent to 
which a pan-European regulator would replace or augment the activities of existing supra-
national bodies and committees. 
4.  Issues Relating to Specific Areas 
4.1.  Interconnection 
Appropriate interconnection arrangements are essential for the creation of a competitive 
telecommunications market.  However, there is as yet no consensus on what constitutes the 
correct basis for setting interconnection prices.  In this context, it is important to note that 
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the proposed Interconnection Directive is compatible with a variety of alternative pricing 
regimes and systems for costing and recovering universal service obligation costs. 
This suggests that one possible role for a pan-European regulator would be to draw up and 
secure  the  implementation  of  a  harmonised  set  of  principles  on  which  to  base 
interconnection charges and universal service payments.  The benefits and costs  of this 
would  have  to  be  compared  with  those  relating  to  the  system  in  the  proposed 
Interconnection  Directive,  whereby  the  Commission,  in  consultation  with  the  ONP 
Committee,  can  issue  recommendations  on  cost  accounting  systems  relating  to 
interconnection, and can draw up guidelines on the costing and financing of universal 
service. 
Secondly, a pan-European body could act to resolve disputes, particularly where the parties 
concerned are operating under authorisations provided by different Member States.  Again, 
however, it will be necessary to consider the benefits and costs of such an arrangement with 
those of the dispute resolution procedure in the proposed Interconnection Directive (which 
involves  the  Commission  in  consultation  with  the  ONP  Committee)  combined  with 
genuinely independent NRAs. 
A third area, in which there may be a role for a pan-European body, is in setting accounting 
settlement rates.  The existing system of rates bears little relationship to underlying costs 
and there are strong grounds for arguing that it should be replaced by an alternative, more 
cost orientated structure.  In practice, there are likely to be a number of problems in moving 
towards a fully cost orientated structure, not the least of which is the existence of different 
costing methodologies in different countries. 
In examining this issue it will again be important to compare the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of a pan-European regulator with other alternatives such as the continuation 
of bilateral negotiations.  For example, which approach is likely to lead to the most rapid 
reduction of charges (both between individual countries and for the EU as a whole) and 
which is least likely to result in distortions in traffic patterns and the location of economic 
activity? 
4.2.  Standards 
There are strong arguments for common standards both within individual countries and 
between countries.  In particular, their adoption can generally be expected to  result in 
reductions in: 
•  research and development costs; 
•  production costs; 
•  testing costs. 
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Common standards are likely to benefit manufacturers and hence operators and customers. 
In addition,  harmonisation  of  standards  may  help  to  facilitate  the  development  of 
competition.  On the other hand, it may take time to develop an appropriate standard and, 
in some cases; an operator may wish to introduce a  new technology before a  common 
standard can be agreed. 
While there is a clear role for a body to set standards it should be recognised that such a 
body, namely ETSI, already exists in Europe.  As a result, it needs to be considered whether 
a pan-European regulator is needed in this area or, conceivably, whether ETSI  might be 
incorporated within such a body, although the existence of non-EU members of ETSI would 
appear to make this difficult. 
4.3.  Allocation and Management of Radio Frequencies 
There is a strong case for harmonisation of the use of radio frequencies within the EU, 
where this is feasible, since: 
•  this reduces interference costs; 
•  enables manufacturers to achieve economies of scale in equipment provision. 
However, as in the case of common standards there already exists a European body in this 
area (ERO).  The potential role of a pan-European regulatory body in the area of spectrum 
allocation and management therefore needs to be evaluated in this context. 
4.4  Numbering 
Numbering is  a  shared resource  across  Europe and the importance of European wide 
cooperation on numbering of telecommunications services is widely recognised and indeed 
the Council passed a resolution on this issue in 1992 (Council Resolution 92/  C318 I 01; OJ 
1992 C318/2)3.  The European Numbering Office (ENO) was established in 1994 to allow the 
opinions of  interested parties  to be taken into  account and for  the Commission to  be 
involved where necessary.  Harmonisation is a key issue and the prospective net benefits of 
a pan-European regulatory body, with a remit in this area, will need to be considered. 
In economic terms, number harmonisation may result in a reduction in transaction costs because, for example, of a 
reduction in misdialled calls. 
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4.5  Licensing 
The proposed Licensing Directive should facilitate the provision of pan-European services 
and infrastructures and enhance the development of competition.  In particular, it contains 
provisions relating to: 
•  harmonisation of licensing conditions and procedures; 
•  reliance  on general authorisations  which largely  remove  the  need to  apply for 
individual licences; 
•  one-stop shopping procedures, via ETO, which enable a single application to result 
in individual licences in different Member States. 
•  a dispute resolution procedure involving the proposed EUTC. 
These provisions in the proposed Directive should help to generate significant economic 
benefits.  Any  move towards pan-European licensing  and harmonised conditions  and 
procedures is likely to result in the more rapid introduction of competition, which in turn 
may lead to dynamic efficiency benefits and a more rapid move towards cost-reflective 
pricing.  Secondly, pan-European licensing is likely to result in a reduction in transaction 
costs relating to licence applications and administration. 
Again,  what we need to identify is  how a  new pan-European regulatory body would 
improve the situation and whether the benefits would outweigh the costs. 
4.6.  Ownership and Competition Regulation 
Competition  regulation  at  the  European  level  is  currently  the  responsibility  of  the 
Commission (DG IV).  Given the existence of a pan-European regulator, a key issue would 
be the separation of powers between such a body and DG N  and between it and NR.As, 
bearing in mind the principle of subsidiarity.  Again the question that needs to be answered 
is what would a pan-European regulator offer in terms of benefits and at what cost. 
4.7.  Convergence of Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
A further area to consider is the implications of the convergence of telecommunications and 
broadcasting.  If a pan-European regulator were to be established, should it deal with both 
telecommunications and broadcasting and should it be restricted to issues relating to access 
and transmission, or also regulate content.  Again, the pros and cons of different solutions, 
with and without a new pan-European body, will need to be considered. 
4.8.  Implementation and Enforcement of Directives 
A  pan-European  regulator  could  conceivably  play  a  role  in  the  implementation  and 
enforcement of directives.  However, the potential role is likely to diminish substantially 
with the creation of genuinely independent NRAs.  The interaction and respective roles of 
the NRAs and the pan-European regulator is a key area that the study will need to address. 
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APPENDIX4.  QUESTIONNAIRE 
Regulatory. and Legal Issues Associated with the 
Creation of a Regulatory Authority at the Level of the European Union 
At  present  Member  State  National  Regulatory  Authorities  (NRAs)  are  the  bodies 
responsible for carrying out most of the EC telecommunications implementation work.  The 
Commission is examining whether this is appropriate in the long term or whether there is a 
need for a pan-European regulatory authority. In particular, the Commission would like to 
understand  how  regulation  can  best  keep  pace  with  developments  in  the 
telecommunications industry, such as the globalisation of telecommunications operators 
and the introduction of trans-European networks and services. 
The aim of the interviews is to discuss, with the interviewees, the arguments for and against 
having various regulatory activities carried out at a European rather than a national level. 
In considering which activities  might be best carried out by pan-European regulation, 
interviewees should not be constrained by what is allowed under current European treaty 
arrangements. 
1.  Interconnection 
1.1  What  is  your  view  of  existing  arrangements  for  and  likely  developments  on 
interconnection in your country? 
1.2  Would the involvement of a  European-wide regulatory body in the regulation of 
interconnection be beneficial? 
1.3  H you consider that there is a need for the involvement of a European-wide body in 
the regulation of interconnection, which elements of the activity do you think should 
be handled at the European level (e.g.  determination of cost-basis, dealing with 
disputes between operators) and why? 
1.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a  European-
wide regulatory body in the area of interconnection, including potential transitional 
difficulties? 
1.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement  of  a  European-wide  regulatory  body  in  the  regulation  of 
interconnection in the coming years? 
2  Standards 
2.1  What  is  your  view  of  existing  arrangements  for  and  likely  developments  in 
standards regulation in your country? 
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2.2  Would the involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the regulation of 
standards be beneficial? 
2.3  If you consider that there is a  need for  the involvement of such a  body in the 
regulation of standards: 
- which elements of the activity do you think should be handled at the European 
level? 
- why do you think each of these activities should be handled at the European 
level? 
- what would be the relationship and distribution of functions between ETSI and 
the new European-wide telecommunications regulator? 
2.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide  regulatory body in the area  of  standards, including potential  transitional 
difficulties? 
2.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the regulation of standards in 
the coming years? 
3.  Allocation and management of radio frequencies 
3.1  What is your view of existing arrangements for and likely developments in radio 
frequency allocation and management in your country? 
3.2  Would the involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the management of 
radio  frequencies  (e.g.  frequency  coordination,  interference,  harmonisation)  be 
beneficial? 
3.3  If you consider that there is a  need for  the involvement of such a  body in the 
allocation of radio frequencies: 
- which elements of the activity do you think should be handled at the European 
level? 
- why do you think each of these activities should be handled at the European 
level? 
- what would  be  the  relationship  and  distribution  of  functions  between  the 
European  Radiocommunications  Office  (ERO)  and  the  new  European-wide 
telecommunications regulator? 
3.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a  European-
wide regulatory body in the area of frequency allocation and management, including 
potential transitional difficulties? 
3.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the allocation and management 
of radio frequencies in the coming years? 
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4.  Numbering 
4.1  What is your view of existing arrangements for  and likely  developments in the 
management of numbering in your country? 
4.2  Would the involvement of a European-wide regulatory body on numbering issues 
be beneficial? 
4.3  If  you consider that there is a need for the involvement of a European-wide body on 
numbering issues: 
- which elements of the activity do you think should be handled at the European 
level (e.g. freephone and premium rate number harmonisation)? 
- why do you think each of these activities should be handled at the European 
level? 
- what would  be  the  relationship  and  distribution  of  functions  between  the 
European  Telecommunications  Office  (ETO)  and  the  new  European-wide 
telecommunications regulator? 
4.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide regulatory body in the area of numbering, including potential transitional 
difficulties? 
4.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement of a European-wide regulatory body on issues in the coming years? 
5.  Licensing and licence conditions 
5.1  What is your view of existing arrangements for and likely developments in your 
country on: 
- allocating and issuing licences; 
- the setting of licence conditions; and 
- the monitoring of compliance with licence conditions? 
5.2  Would the involvement of a European-wide regulatory body be beneficial in these 
activities?  In particular, do you see advantages in the existence of pan-European 
licences? 
5.3  If  you consider that there is a need for the involvement of a European-wide body in 
licensing, which elements of the activity do you think should be  handled at the 
European level and why? 
5.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide  regulatory  body  in the  area  of  licensing,  including  potential  transitional 
difficulties? 
5.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the regulation of licensing in 
the coming years? 
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6.  Ownership and competition regulation 
6.1  What  is  your  view  of  existing  arrangements  for  and  likely  developments  in 
telecommunications specific ownership and competition regulation in your country? 
6.2  Would the involvement of a  European-wide regulatory body in ownership and 
competition regulation for the telecommunications sector and, possibly, the audio-
visual sector, be beneficial? 
6.3  If you consider that there is a  need for the involvement of a  European-wide in 
ownership  and  competition  regulation  related  to  telecommunications  and 
broadcasting, which elements of the activity do you think should be handled at the 
European level and why? 
6.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide regulatory body in the area of telecommunications and audio-visual ownership 
and competition regulation, including potential transitional difficulties? 
6.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement  of  a  European-wide  regulatory  body  ownership  and  competition 
regulation in the telecommunications and audio-visual sectors in the coming years? 
7.  Implementation and enforcement of Directives (e.g. ONP) 
7.1  What is your view of existing arrangements for the implementation and enforcement 
of  telecommunications  related  Directives  in  your  country?  How  are  these 
arrangements likely to change in the future? 
7.2  Would the involvement of a European-wide regulatory body in the implementation 
and enforcement of Directives be beneficial? 
7.3  If  you consider that there is a need for the involvement of a European-wide body in 
the implementation and enforcement of Directives, which elements of the activity do 
you think should be handled at the European level and why? 
7.4  What would be  your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide  regulatory  body  in  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  Directives, 
including potential transitional difficulties? 
7.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement  of  a  European-wide  regulatory  body  in  the  implementation  and 
enforcement of Directives in the coming years? 
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8.  Others 
8.1  In what other activities do you think the involvement of a European-wide regulatory 
body might be beneficial?  Examples might include: 
- customer protection, i.e. dealing with complaints by users and service providers 
- regulation of price levels and price structures 
- funding and enforcement of universal service obligations (USO) 
- issues relating to number portability 
8.2  What is your view of existing arrangements for and ~ely  developments on each of 
these activities in your country? 
8.3  For each of these activities, which elements do you think should be handled at the 
European level and why? 
8.4  What would be your concerns, if any, regarding the involvement of a European-
wide  regulatory  body  in each  of  the  activities  you  have  identified,  including 
potential transitional difficulties? 
8.5  How are developments in telecommunications likely to affect the desirability of the 
involvement of a  European-wide regulatory body in these other activities in the 
coming years? 
9.  Further thoughts on the possible creation of a pan-European regulator 
9.1  Where, if at all, would you consider the involvement of a European-wide regulator 
to be of greatest relevance and urgency? 
9.2  Are there any other relevant issues, not covered by the above list of questions, which 
you wish to discuss? 
9.3  If relevant, what, in general terms, would you see as the respective roles of a pan-
European regulator and national regulatory authorities? 
9.4  How would you summarise your overall conclusions on the possible creation of a 
European-wide regulator? 
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APPENDIX 5.  EXISTING INSTITUTIONS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Numerous  bodies  are  involved  in  telecommunications  both  at  pan-European  and 
Community levels, and it is useful to recall how some of these institutions and Community 
bodies were established and the role they play in telecommunications in Europe 
1.  Pan-European Telecommunication Bodies 
As discussed in Chapter 6 of the Main Report, the breadth of membership of a European 
Regulatory Authority might extend to non-EU countries.  It is helpful to review the pan-
European  telecommunications  bodies  whose  membership  already  extends  to  non-EU 
Member States, the mechanisms by which EU Member States transferred their sovereignty 
to them, and how these pan-European bodies are linked to the EU, if at all.  A description of 
pan-European telecommunications bodies is provided in Chapter 2 of the Main Report. 
1.1  ERC/ERO 
The Convention for the Establishment of the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO) 
is dated 23 June 1993 but only came into force on 1 March 1996, replacing the former MoU 
establishing the Office. 
In becoming a Contracting Party, States had the choice of either signing the Convention 
prior to 1 March 1996, to take effect from 23 June 1993, or acceding to the Convention after 1 
March 1996. 
Article 18, "the Rights and Obligations of the Contracting Parties", states: 
(1)  Nothing in this Convention shall interfere with the sovereign right of  each 
Contracting Party to regulate its own telecommunications. 
(2)  Each Contracting Party which is a Member State of  the European Economic 
Community  will apply this Convention  in accordance with its obligations 
under the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
(3)  No reservation may be made to this Convention. 
ERO does not, therefore, take any sovereign powers away from the Member States or the 
Community. 
There is a direct link between both ERO and the ERC by virtue of an MoU and Framework 
Contract between the ERC and the Commission, under the terms of which the Community 
may  sponsor  work  requirements.  These  are  generally  studies which are intended  to 
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facilitate  the development of European telecommunications policy.  We  were unable to 
obtain a copy of this document, but consider a similar document below in the context of 
ECTRA. 
ERO/ERC have coordinated their work, ,particularly with E1SI, via Molls which specify 
procedures  for  close  collaboration  in  the  development  of  standards  for  systems  or 
equipment on the one hand and the harmonisation of frequency bands and regulatory 
requirements  on the  other.  Further,  there is  a  joint ERC/ECTRA/ITU Group  which 
prepares for ITU Council meetings and Plenipotentiary Conferences. 
We understand that the Commission is currently working on a report to the Council on the 
implementation of ERC Decisions, the idea being that these Decisions will become binding 
agreements to which the Member States will commit themselves in writing. 
1.2  ETSI 
The  ETSI  Statutes,  adopted  on  21  November  1990,  state  that  representatives  of  the 
Community and EFTA  shall enjoy  special status as "Counsellors"  at both the General 
Assembly and the Technical Assembly.  Article 17 states that ETSI  shall establish close 
working relationships with other European standards bodies. 
The Statutes do not address the question of sovereignty or obligations under the EC Treaty. 
1.3  ECTRA/ETO 
ECTRA  signed a  Memorandum of Understanding with the European Commission on 9 
September 1994,  the same day on which,  in accordance with the MoU,  ETO  signed a 
Framework Contract with the Commission.  Under the former, the Commission will give 
..,due  consideration"  to  any  relevant  ECTRA  outputs,  ..,in  particular  Decisions  or 
Recommendations";  the  Commission  and  ETO  meet  regularly  to  discuss  pertinent 
telecommunications issues, and they agree a yearly programme of work to be contracted out 
toETO. 
Under the Framework Contract, the Commission places specific contracts with ETO.  ETO is 
also  intended  as  a  centre  of  expertise,  which  will  follow  the  work  of  different 
standardisation bodies such as ETSI, ITU and ISO.  It is also intended to form a close alliance 
with licensing and numbering experts from NRAs, in particular with those participating in 
ECTRA Project Teams on licensing, mobile, interconnection and numbering. 
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2.  Community-level Committees 
A number of Committees at the Community level are involved in telecommunications, and 
these are briefly considered or referred to below. 
2.1  The ONP Committee 
Created by Articles  9  and 10  of Directive  90/387,  the ONP committee is an advisory 
committee comprising representatives of Member States, and is chaired by a Commission 
representative.  Acting in an advisory role, it assists the Commission in relation to Open 
Network Provision issues.  The Committee has an advisory, a regulatory and a conciliation 
role (the last function is being discussed under Section 4.3.2 of the Main Report).  The ONP 
Committee's advisory and regulatory roles are managed under procedures I  and ill(a) 
respectively of Council Decision 87  /373/EEC (the "comitology'' procedures). According to 
both procedures, the representative of the Commission on the Committee submits to the 
Committee a draft of the measures to be taken.  The Committee must deliver its opinion on 
the draft within a time limit which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of 
the matter.  The procedures then diverge: so according to the advisory function, the opinion 
is recorded in the minutes, and each Member State has the right to ask to have its position 
recorded. The Commission "shall take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the 
Committee and "it shall inform the Committee of the manner in which its opinion has been 
taken into account". 
According to the regulatory function, in the case of decisions which the Council is required 
to adopt on a proposal from the Commission, the Opinion is to be delivered by a weighted 
majority  (as  laid down in Article 148(2)).  The Commission "shall adopt the measures 
envisaged if  they are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee". If  they are not, or if 
no opinion is delivered, 
11the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a 
proposal  relating  to  the  measures  to  be  taken.  The  Council  shall  act by a  qualified 
majority~~. According to variant (a), as laid down in Directive 90/387, if  the Council has not 
acted within 3 months after  the date of referral  to  it, 
11the proposed measure shall be 
adopted by the Commission". 
The regulatory function of the ONP Committee only applies in relation to rules for uniform 
application  of the  essential  requirements,  rules  on standards  necessary  to  ensure  the 
interoperability of trans-frontier services and amendment of the annexes of certain ONP 
Directives.  Although the role is therefore narrow, the Council's first common position on 
the Voice Telephony Directive was rejected by the European Parliament (under the ''co-
decision" procedure) because the European Parliament does not have any involvement in 
decisions  taken under regulatory  committee  procedures.  This  problem has  now been 
overcome by an inter-institutional agreement (a "modus vivendi") which ensures that the 
European Parliament is able to give an opinion when the Commission presents measure to 
committees of Member States representatives. 
23 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority 
Similarly,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  recommended  that  the  Community 
Telecommunications Committee proposed under the (now aborted) proposals for mutual 
recognition of licensing (see below) should have regulatory functions, but the Commission 
resisted this decision in order to avoid a further comitology debate with Parliament. 
2.2  The Approvals Committee on Terminal Equipment 
This Committee was established by Directive 91/263 to advise the Commission on draft 
measures taken under the Directive - particularly the conversion of telecommunications 
standards into common technical regulations.  The Commission is obliged to take "the 
utmost account'' of the Committee's opinion. 
2.3  The Licensing Committee 
The Commission's two proposals of 1992 and 1994 on the mutual recognition of licences (see 
Appendix 9) focused on the creation of a Community Telecommunications Committee, to 
have a  broader role  than the two committees  mentioned above.  The  draft Directives 
envisaged  a  similar  advisory  role,  though  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
recommended a regulatory role under the guidelines set out in Council Decision of July 13, 
1987.  This was rejected on the ground of inevitable resistance from Parliament and the 
Member States, and, indeed, the two proposals have been superseded by a new proposal 
(see Appendix 9).  The Proposed Licensing Directive includes the creation of a Licensing 
Committee to assist the Commission on licensing issues.  In the Common Position on the 
Licensing Directive, the Council changed the name of European Union Telecommunications 
Committee into the Licensing Committee.  At second reading, the European Parliament has 
adopted an amendment including within the review provisions in the Directive the need to 
examine the possible consolidation of the various committees established in Community 
telecommunications legislation. 
2.4  Senior Officials Group on Telecommunications 
This group was set up by the Council on 4 November 1983, but much of its work has been 
taken over by the High Level Committee (see below) and it has not met for four years. 
2.5  The Joint Committee on Telecommunications 
This  was  initiated  in  June  1990,  with  the  aim  of  establishing  a  dialogue  in  the 
telecommunications sector at EC level. 
2.6  The High Level Committee 
This Committee was recognised as a permanent forum by Council Resolution 93/  C 213/01. 
It consists of the heads of the NRAs who meet to discuss issues of general policy - it is 
jointly chaired by DG IV and DG XIII. 
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2.7  National Regulatory Authorities 
The other relevant bodies are the NRAs, but it is beyond the scope of this Study to include 
an analysis of their functions. 
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APPENDIX 6.  LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM OTHER 
SECTORS 
·As  mentioned~ in Section 5.3  of the Main Report,  Community agencies in other sectors 
provide limited guidance as to the form and functions of a European Regulatory Authority, 
but a review of the various bodies is useful in  identifying some operational difficulties that a 
European Regulatory Authority may encounter. 
1.  Trade Marks 
1.1  Background 
Trade  mark  law across  Europe was harmonised  by the  Trade  Marks  Directive  of 21 
December 1988, and has been implemented in every Member State except Ireland. The next 
steps were the creation of a Community-wide trade mark and an office to manage the new 
system.  Pro~ion was made for both of these steps in Regulation 40/94, known as the 
Community Trade Mark Regulation, adopted by the Council on 20  December 1993.  The 
new system allows for the protection of trade marks in all the countries of the EU by means 
of a single filing.  The new office is known as the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market (Office of Harmonisation). 
Simply put, once the application is sent to Alicante, the Office of Harmonisation will do two 
things.  It must establish whether the mark is registrable within the terms of the Regulation 
(e.g. it must be distinctive, and not consist of a generic or customary term), and it must draw 
up a search report on any other conflicting Community Trade Marks, while the national 
trade mark offices of the Member States will search their own registers. This should be 
completed within three months, and the application, provided it has not been withdrawn as 
a result of the searches or on absolute grounds, will then be published.  Other companies 
will then have three months in which to challenge registration. 
1.2.  Reason for European Regulation 
The Trade Marks Directive has removed several barriers to trade created in particular by 
differences in national laws.  But others still exist, such as the problem of conflicting marks 
being owned in different Member States by unconnected enterprises;  the fact that a trade 
mark owner can choose a different mark for different countries; and the fact that voluntary 
assignment  can fragment  a  trade  mark  right among  different  enterprises.  Also,  the 
harmonising law will still operate in the context of ·varying legal systems and traditions, and 
linguistic differences will result in a proposed trade mark receiving different treatment at 
the  hands  of  different  national  registries.  These  problems  may  be  overcome  by  a 
Community Trade Mark. 
From a wider perspective, this development is an important one in the consolidation of the 
internal market, and continues the trend towards decentralisation for areas in which it is 
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perceived  that  greater  efficiency  can  be  achieved  in  terms  of  administration  and 
management. 
1.3  Operational Problems caused by National  /European Split 
Problems are foreseen and have been experienced:  there was much argument over where to 
site the Office of Harmonisation and which official languages to use.  There will be cost 
disadvantages because different languages will be used, and the Office of Harmonisation is 
in Spain but the translations are to  be carried out in Luxembourg.  The original five-
language rule was watered down after complaints from the Belgians and Dutch, and the 
rule will now be that applications can be made in any of the 11 official languages of the EU, 
but any opposition proceedings or challenges to the mark after it has been registered must 
be made in one of the five working languages of the Office of Harmonisation.  This could 
cause problems if  the two languages are not widely used within the EU, such as Greek and 
Spanish (one of the five  working languages), and there is scope for  companies to use 
languages tactically to ensure that proceedings are conducted in their native language. 
Another potential problem is that companies have already expressed concerns about fees. 
First, it will not be cheap despite the fact that the Office of Harmonisation is non-profit 
making.  For example, the filing fee will  be Ecu 975 and the registration fee will  be Ecu 1100. 
Secondly,  and  perhaps  more  seriously,  the  Office  of  Harmonisation  will only  accept 
payment in Ecu, and at present it seems that it will require the payments to be made into a 
bank in Alicante, which could place a considerable administrative burden on companies. 
There could be problems where there is a prior trade mark in a Member State, as this will 
prevent the registering of a Community Trade Mark- so national registering in each State 
would still be required.  Further, as the market becomes ever more integrated, brands will 
have to work equally well in several languages - what is acceptable as a  mark in one 
language may be a fairly ordinary word in another.  Other problems could arise when new 
countries join the EU. 
Ultimately, particularly given that the system is not mandatory, it may not have mu~ 
impact on European integration.  Predictions of the volume of applications are low.  In the 
first year, the vice-president of the Office of Harmonisation expects only 15,000 applications. 
The UK registry of trade marks has stated that, over time, it expects to lose no more than 
20% of foreign applications (which make up half of UK applications). 
1.4  Legal Basis 
The Regulation has as its basis Article 235 of the EC Treaty: 
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on a proposal from  the  Commission and after consulting the European  Parliament, 
take the appropriate measures. 
The significance of the choice of a Regulation as the legislative vehicle is that under Article 
189 of the EC  .. Treaty .such .legislation .is directly applicable in all Member States, i.e. it has 
uniform effect throughout the EU  and has automatic legal force  without the need for 
intervening national legislation. 
The Preamble to the Regulation provides an insight into the extent of the powers granted to 
the Office of Harmonisation: 
... it is ... essential,  while  retaining  the  community's existing institutional structure 
and balance of  powers, to establish an office for harmonisation in the internal market 
(trade marks and designs) which is independent in relation to technical matters and 
has legal, administrative and financial autonomy; whereas to this end it is necessary 
and appropriate that it should be a body of  the community having legal personality 
and exercising implementing powers which are conferred on it by this  regulation, 
and  that  it  should  operate  within  the  framework  of community  law  without 
detracting from the competencies exercised by the community institutions. 
1.5  Conclusions 
The relevance of the Office of Harmonisation to the creation of a  European Regulatory 
Authority is discussed il}  Sections 4.4.2d and 5.3 of the Main Report. 
2.  Aviation 
2.1  Background 
In  1990  the  European  Air Traffic  Control  Harmonisation  and  Integration  Programme 
(EATCHIP)  was  launched,  managed  by  the  17-member  Eurocontrol  on behalf of  the 
European  Civil  Aviation  Conference  (ECAC).  The  ECAC  is  an  inter-governmental 
organisation whose aim is to promote the continued development of a safe, efficient and 
sustainable  European air  transport system;  there  are  currently 33  member states.  An 
important development has been the establishment of a Central Flow Management Unit at 
Eurocontrol in Brussels, which will be fully operational in April, and is intended to play an 
increasing role in managing traffic flows across Europe and in further reducing delays. 
Also  established under the auspices of EATCHIP was the En Route Strategy, which is 
intended to develop radar coverage across Europe. 
In September 1994,  the  European  Parliament approved  a  resolution  submitted by the 
Transport Committee on the harmonisation of Air Traffic Control (ATC), and the Council 
Resolution on 24th October 1994  considered the same  topic.  On 6th March 1996,  the 
Commission issued a White Paper entitled "Air Traffic  Management - Freeing Europe's 
Airspace" which discusses the possibility of establishing a single Air Traffic Control body. 
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The Parliamentary Resolution on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference states that "the 
Treaty should provide for  an integrated common transport policy including powers in air 
traffic control". 
2.2.  Reason for European Regulation 
The Council Resolution states that an efficient aviation sector in Europe requires significant 
progress to be  made in the sphere of air traffic control/  management, and calls for  the 
Commission to give this special priority.  The Transport Committee resolution states that 
the current anachronistic fragmentation of the European ATC system, with management at 
national level,  is based on principles  which are now obsolete  and  inadequate.  This 
situation,  combined  with  the  increase  in  summer  traffic  and  the  French  air  traffic 
controllers' strike (which was itself a result of the shortcomings of the ATC system), led to 
serious inconvenience last summer and will deteriorate further with increased demand due 
particularly to the third stage of air transport liberalisation to take effect. 
The Committee calls on the Commission to act as soon as possible on the harmonisation and 
integration of the European ATC system and the establishment of the basic framework for a 
single unified system covering the entire community air space and controlled by a single 
Community Civil Aviation Authority.  It feels  that the problems of energy saving, noise 
reduction and environmental protection should be an integral part of community ATC 
policy;  that a flexible use of air space will achieve better cooperation between civilian and 
military  authorities,  allowing  civilian  utilisation  of  military  air  space;  and  that 
harmonisation would facilitate the free movement of citizens of the EU. 
The Association of European Airlines has had a blueprint for a single European system on 
the table since 1989, and they argue that it would save the airlines and their customers 
millions of dollars and thousands of wasted hours, and would provide room for growth 
instead of slow strangulation. 
According to the White Paper, at present, air traffic management is the responsibility of 
individual countries.  Inter-state cooperation exists in the form of different organisations 
(E.g.  the  European  Civil  Aviation  Conference  (ECAC),  Eurocontrol  (the  European 
organisation for air traffic safety) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)) 
working  in  parallel  which  duplicates  resources.  These  organisations  are  based  on 
government-to-government decision-making processes which the Commission perceives as 
ineffective.  Furthermore, the various organisations are lacking in the power necessary to 
implement the technical programmes, and the European Community has no formal status in 
any of these organisations.  Inadequate capacity in air traffic control systems has caused a 
high proportion of flight delays since mid-1994 at a cost of some ECU 2000 million. 
23.  Operational problems caused by National/European split 
The harmonisation process is at a very early stage so any problems are mainly in the future. 
Certainly there would be political difficulties in developing a single European ATC, since it 
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would involve ceding sovereignty of airspace to  the new body.  There would also be 
extremely demanding organisational problems.  Christopher Chataway, chairman of the 
UK' s Civil Aviation Authority, told the European Aviation Oub in Brussels in October 1995 
that the present situation  is "a collection of very complicated businesses operating in 34 
different and highly political environments. -It is unlikely that the political and management 
genius exists to run all these organisations as a single entity." 
The  White Paper states that there is a  need to have a  central authority with a  specific 
mandate and with the appropriate means to set up a  single A  TM  system.  The  Paper 
explores three options to achieve this:  a monolithic structure having all regulatory and 
operational  control,  a  regulatory  framework  limited  to  the  Community,  or a  broader 
European solution. 
The Commission rejected arguments in favour of a single structure combining regulatory 
and operational functions, maintaining that the two functions should be kept separate as far 
as practicable.  It considers that the two areas are very different, one requiring legal and 
administrative competence and the other based on technical knowledge and management 
proficiency.  As to a framework within the EU only, the Commission feels it does not have 
the particular expertise in A  TM and that a new executive body will have to be set up to 
prepare the decisions and monitor developments.  This will be difficult to justify given that 
other organisations are already working in this field and the tasks of the new body will 
coincide largely with those of Eurocontrol.  The Commission therefore suggests the setting-
up of a system of A  TM at the widest possible European level.  Such a broad coverage will be 
a far better way of improving the efficiency  of European A  TM  and will provide more 
flexibility, increasing the scope for sub-regional groupings to further integrate their airspace 
if  they choose to do so.  Another advantage of using a wider multilateral organisation is, the 
Paper states, that national governments might find it easier to allow such an organisation to 
play a role in the military use of airspace.  The system will be based on the centralised 
exercise of regulatory functions together with operational tasks in the fields of air traffic 
flow management and air space management, but with other operational tasks remaining 
with individual countries. 
The  Commission recommends  the reinforcement of Eurocontrol'  s  regulatory powers to 
make it the sole air traffic regulator in Europe.  Eurocontrol must be given the powers and 
mechanisms for decision-taking and monitoring needed to carry out its role with proper 
authority.  The Community must become a member of the new Eurocontrol with the weight 
and terms which will enable it to exercise its competence and allow its institutions to 
perform the roles allocated to them by the Treaty. 
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2.4.  Legal basis 
The Transport Committee resolution had regard to Article  7a  of the EC  Treaty,  which 
begins: 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of  progressively establishing the 
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992; 
and Article 5, which begins: 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment  of the  obligations  arising  out of this  Treaty  or resulting from 
action taken by the institutions of  the Community. 
The White Paper propounds the following legal bases for regulation in the ATM sector: 
•  Article  75(1)  which  states  that  "the  Council... will  establish ... measures  to  improve 
transport safety  ...  "; 
•  Article 84(2) for matters directly linked to the furtherance of the common transport 
policy; 
•  Article lOOa for harmonisation measures; 
•  Article 129c for the interoperability and interconnection of national air traffic control 
systems; 
•  Article 130h for research coordination. 
2.5.  Conclusions 
The conclusions to be drawn are limited by the fact that the single ATC body is merely an 
idea at the moment.  The interest lies is in the practical, political and economic arguments 
for and against the establishment of such a body. The White Paper concludes that it would 
be most sensible, given the existence and powers of Eurocontrol, to "reinvent'' the body, 
rather than create a new body.  An important point here is that this body is wider than 
merely the European Union, given that the Paper concludes that the new A  TM  system 
should be wider than the Union.  The Instar Study is presently looking into a  range of 
organisational models which will meet the requirements of the Paper; this will lead to 
revision of the Eurocontrol Convention as required to meet the model selected. 
A further point of interest is that the Commission states: 
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Community  competence  would  facilitate  building  a  single  ATM  system,  the 
Commission considers it essential that the Community becomes a full member of  this 
organisation.  This will allow the Community to exercise its competence and ensure 
that decisions  were compatible with the policies of the  Treaty and were  taken  in a 
more transparent.and.democratic way ... Similarly., the positions of  the Member States 
in matters where they are competent should be coordinated according to procedures 
which  ensure  close  cooperation  and  the  unity  of the  Community  position  in 
international fora. 
3.  Environment 
The European Environment Agency was provided for in Regulation 1210/90, which came 
into force  only in October 1993  after it was agreed that the headquarters would be in 
Copenhagen. It has been established  to gather information and data on the state of the 
environment in the Community, and to publish a report every three years.  It is also charged 
with disseminating the information it gathers and harmonising the measurement of data 
throughout the Community. 
The Agency's role is limited, and therefore is of limited value as an analogy. It has not been 
given any enforcement or policing powers in relation to environmental legislation.  In fact, 
the  European  Parliament  has  been  trying  to  introduce  such  powers  by  proposing 
amendments to  the Regulation,  in the hope of converting it into a  form of European 
Environment Inspectorate.  However, there is a provision in the Regulation which requires 
the Council  to reconsider  the scope  of the  Agency's  powers within two years  of the 
Regulation coming into force, which in particular specifies a possible role in monitoring the 
implementation of EC environmental legislation. 
Perhaps the most interesting point about the European Environment Agency is that it 
illustrates, in contrast to the proposed role of a European Regulatory Authority, just how 
little power has been granted to some, indeed most, EC bodies. 
4.  Pharmaceuticals 
4.1.  Background 
Although harmonisation  of  the pharmaceutical legislation  was  completed in 1992,  the 
question of the harmonisation of decisions on the authorisation of individual medicinal 
products remained outstanding.  To remedy this, a Council Regulation of 22nd July 1993 
laid  down  Community  procedures  for  the  establishment  of  a  European  Medicines 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA").  The EMEA opened in London in January 1995, its purpose 
to promote the free circulation of medicinal products by coordinating and supervising their 
licensing  across  the  EU  and in due course  the  EFT A  countries.  The  first  marketing 
authorisations from the EMEA were granted towards the end of 1995. 
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The function of the EMEA, in brief, is to provide a single marketing authorisation, through a 
"centralised procedure",  which is valid throughout the Union for  medicinal products 
intended for human or veterinary use.  Use of the centralised procedure is compulsory for 
medicinal  products  derived  from  biotechnological  processes.  Applications  must  be 
submitted directly to. the EMEA for scientific evaluation by a  scientific Committee.  The 
Committee has a fixed period (210 days) in which to reach an opinion which is then sent to 
the applicant, the Commission and the Member States.  The applicant has a right to appeal 
against the decision.  The Commission then prepares a draft decision and Member States 
have 28 days in which to make written observations to the European Commission.  If  these 
raise new scientific or technical questions not addressed by the scientific Committee then 
they may be referred back to the Committee for further consideration.  A final decision is 
taken  by  the  Commission  after  consulting  a  Standing  Committee  (consisting  of 
representatives of Member States with a  representative of the European Commission as 
Chairman) or, in the event of a significant disagreement between Member States, by the 
European Council. 
4.2.  Reason for European Regulation 
Until the EMEA was set up, drugs companies had to submit applications to each agency in 
the 15 Member States, waiting up to six years for authorisation.  Such delays reduced the 
value  of patent protection (although there is now supplementary certificate  protection 
available which alleviates this problem to some extent) and it cost Ecu 200  million per 
product to provide the required data.  The system did not reassure public opinion about the 
safety of medicines; for example, it is difficult to understand why commonly used products 
such as the sleeping pill Halcion had to be withdrawn from one country but were accepted 
by the next.  The single evaluation is designed to be of the highest possible scientific quality, 
reinforcing the protection of public health.  A list of 1,600 experts has been established by 
the EMEA  to serve within teams coordinated by the scientific Committees.  A  telematic 
network is also being set up with the assistance of the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre of Ispra, the purpose of which is to ensure fast and secure data transmission (e.g. of 
assessment  reports  and  pharmacovigilance  alerts).  The  opinions  of  the  scientific 
Committees and the  assessment reports,  after  removal of confidential information, are 
available  to the public.  The measures are designed to promote the free  circulation of 
medicinal products within the community, as well as saving the Member States money by 
banishing duplication of effort. 
4.3.  Operational Problems caused by National/European Split 
A  decentralised  procedure still  applies  to  the  majority  of medicinal  products  (i.e.  not 
innovatory or biotechnological) whereby an applicant who wishes to market his product in 
more than one Member State can apply for recognition in other Member States based on an 
assessment report from the first licensing authority.  It is anticipated that there will remain 
inconsistencies in the experience and approach of different Member States militating against 
mutual recognition under the decentralised procedure.  In the case of serious objections the 
dispute will be referred to a single committee which will arbitrate.  There are fears that 
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Member  States  may,  either  by  this  method or  through  the  power of veto  under  the 
centralised procedure, obstruct applications.  At a time when States are trying to control 
health budgets, rapid approval of expensive drugs could mean higher drugs bills. 
In 1994 the EMEA received 6,800,800 Ecu from the Community's budget which was totally 
devoted to investment expenditure.  The major part of this money was spent on selecting, 
leasing and fitting out the new headquarters and installing computer equipment.  The initial 
operational budget was said by the EMEA to be in the order of 20 million Ecu. 
4.4.  Legal Basis 
The  EMEA  was set up under the  Council Regulation 2309/93  (the  "Regulation")  and 
London was chosen as its seat by a decision of the Heads of State and Government on 29 
October 1993.  The Regulation has as its basis Article 235  of the EC Treaty, the implied 
powers provision.  Any legislation based on this Article has to be agreed by unanimous vote 
in the Council of Ministers.  The significance of the choice of a Regulation as a legislative 
vehicle is that under Article 189 of the EC Treaty such legislation is directly applicable in all 
Member States, i.e. it has uniform effect throughout the EU and has automatic legal force 
without need for intervening legislation.  Some of the Recitals in the Regulation illustrate 
the purpose for which the EMEA was set up, for example: 
YVhereas only after a single scientific evaluation of  the highest possible standard of 
the quality, safety or efficacy of technologically advanced medicinal products,  to be 
undertaken within the European Agency for the Evaluation of  Medicinal Products, 
should  a  marketing  authorisation  be  granted  by  the  Community  by  a  rapid 
procedure  ensuring  close  cooperation  between  the  Commission  and  Member 
States ...... . 
Fees to be paid to the EMEA for  the evaluation of medicinal products (which were the 
subject of some debate with some EU Members objecting to the proposed fees which they 
regarded as high compared with fees then charged in those individual states) were set out 
in Council Regulation  297/95.  The debate over fees caused some delay in the start of 
operations at the EMEA. 
4.5.  Conclusion 
The establishment of the EMEA  should lead to better use of the considerable product 
licensing expertise currently spread across the Member States of the EU.  It remains to be 
seen if the application process, which is subject to tight time limits, will be speedier under 
the new arrangements and so reduce delays in bringing medicinal products to the market. 
Even with the EMEA there are mechanisms by which individual Member States can raise 
new issues, which, in theory, could delay the authorisation processes.  The agency has only 
been operating for approximately one year and has begun granting authorisations.  It is 
probably too early to assess how efficiently the new system is working. 
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5.  Patents 
5.1.  Background 
Under the European Patent Convention "EPC" (which is not an EU measure) provision is 
made for a single patent application to be made in the European Patent Office ("EPO") in 
Munich which will nominate to particular nation states in which patent protection is sought. 
The application takes effect as a bundle of national patents in designated states.  Issues of 
validity are dealt with at the European level, while issues of infringement are generally 
dealt with at the level of individual nation states, although there is provision, recognised in 
certain countries, for pan-European injunctions. 
5.2.  Reason for European Provisions 
Whilst the EPC  has been a successful system for  a number of years for the granting of 
patents in all the Member States of the European Union, and some non-EU states, it is not a 
European Union convention and the EPO is not an EU  organisation.  The EPC does not 
provide an EU-wide system whereby a patent can be granted, by a single grant, to take 
effect throughout the whole of the EU. 
5.3.  Operational Problems caused by National/European Split 
The  Community Patent will not replace  existing national  patents or the EPC  but the 
question of which system is used by a proprietor will probably be determined by fees and 
the extent of the protection required.  It seems likely that fees  will be set so that, for 
example, a proprietor requiring protection in only one EU state would find that it is not cost 
effective to apply for wider protection. In contrast, a proprietor wishing to obtain EU-wide 
protection would find that the Community Patent Convention ("CPC")  route would be 
cheaper.  A 1989 Agreement (see below) provides for non-EU countries to join the CPC 
where they are invited to do so.  It would first be necessary for the patent laws of those 
invited states to be compatible with the CPC.  It is possible that the joining of countries to 
the CPC on an invitation basis will result in various arrangements being made for those 
invited countries, perhaps on a case by case basis, and various levels of membership arising. 
This may be a  particularly important issue for  the developing Eastern European block 
countries. 
5.4.  Legal Basis 
For many years there have been proposals for the adoption and ratification of a Community 
Patent Convention which, by contrast with the EPC,  will allow for a  single community 
patent across all Member States.  Adoption of the CPC has been held up by disputes over 
translations and conflicts with the constitutional requirements of Member States.  There 
was, in 1989, a Community Patent Agreement which sets out provisions for bringing the 
Community patent system into being.  In  order for the 1989 Agreement to come into force, it 
must be ratified by all the signatory States and will then come into effect twelve months 
after the last State to ratify does so. 
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5.5.  Conclusions 
Whilst there may be a demand for an EU-wide CPC, the convention still awaits ratification. 
The UK Patents Act 1977 s86 and 87 provides for the implementation of such a convention 
already (from a date to be appointed).  In view of the differences in the memberships of the 
EPC and the EU (EPC membership extends to many countries outside the EU) it is possible 
that when the CPC is finalised it will need to be extended beyond the EU to provide for this 
difference. 
Parallels may perhaps be drawn between the grant of a single community patent and a 
single community telecommunications licence.  The patents granted under the CPC are 
intended to co-exist with national patents, leaving it for the applicant to determine whether 
he wishes to have a community patent or national patent and that level of choice may also 
be relevant in the field of telecommunications licences. 
6.  European Monetary Institute - a body requiring Treaty amendment 
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund ("EMCF") was the operating fund within the 
EMS system. EMS member countries deposited gold and dollar reserves with the EMCF in 
exchange for European currency units. The EMCF was dissolved by the Maastricht Treaty, 
which provided for the establishment of a new central body, in the European Monetary 
Institute ("EMI") to strengthen  monetary policies coordination of the Member States. The 
(EMI) took over the role of EMCF and its assets and liabilities. 
The EMI was established under Article 109f of the EC Treaty (as amended by the Maastricht 
Treaty) on 1 January 1994. The EMI Statute was separately provided in a Protocol to the 
Treaty. EMI members consists of central banks of the Member States. It is governed by a 
Council consisting  of  the  central bank  governors  from  the  15  Member  States,  plus  a 
Chairman. Maastricht laid down a firm timetable of three stages towards adoption of the 
Ecu as a single currency: the first was a loose process of convergence, the second started 
with the creation of EMI  and greater convergence and the third stage (scheduled for 1 
January 1997 or 1999 at the latest) will see the adoption  of the Ecu and EMI being absorbed 
into a proper European Central Bank. 
The main objective of EMI is to contribute to achieving the conditions necessary for the third 
stage of European monetary union. It  does this by coordinating monetary policies to ensure 
price stability and preparing  towards the establishment of the European Central Bank 
(Article  4b), the conduct of a single monetary policy and the creation of a single currency in 
the third stage and overseeing the development of Ecu. EMI also monitors the functioning 
of the EMS, holds consultations concerning the course of monetary policies and is consulted 
by the national monetary authorities before they take decisions on the monetary policy in 
the context of achieving monetary union. 
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EMI is charged with drawing up the regulatory, organisational and logistical framework 
necessary for the European Central Bank (''ECB") to perform its task in the third stage. The 
ECB is designed to sit at the centre of a European system of central banks and will fix a 
common interest rate policy for  those in the monetary union once  exchange rates  are 
pegged, and will issue .and regulate the.new single currency. 
The Institute is of interest, being an example of a body which, by virtue of its extensive 
regulatory and other powers, required specific Treaty amendment.  The ECB, too, is a body 
to be created according to a specific Treaty amendment. 
7.  OFSAT-Aborted Body 
The Denton Hall OFSAT  preliminary study- (1990)  recommended the setting up of an 
Office of Satellite Policy (OFSAT).  Its role would have been to officiate satellite policy at 
national,  EC  and  international  level  including  regulation,  standards,  frequencies  and 
development relating to all types of satellite services. In addition OFSAT could have the 
following brief: 
•  coordinating with international bodies and organising a pan-European approach to 
their activities 
•  liaising with related European bodies concerned with satellite technology 
•  formulation  of policy initiatives with a  view to  their being implemented as EC 
Directives 
•  dealing with concerns of satellite operators, investigation of complaints with power 
to rectify abuses of process or dominant position. 
It was important that OFSAT be impartial, not influenced by domestic governments, PTTs 
or major operators. It should also have enforceable powers to deal not only with policy 
issues but also  everyday policy problems faced  by the satellite industry.  It should be 
equipped with powers to ensure its rulings were respected, including sanctions to prevent 
operators, governments and PITs proceeding in breach of OFSAT's  rulings in satellite 
policy.  It is also expected that by empowering OFSAT with these formal powers it would be 
able to exert informal pressure by virtue of its being an influential body. 
Ideally, OFSAT' s powers could include extension of its jurisdiction to the whole of Europe, 
given considerable voting power at international conferences and increased opportunities to 
steer  international  negotiations  in  directions  that  would  benefit  Europe  as  a  whole. 
Domestic governments would surrender their jurisdiction over satellite policy to OFSAT 
and  undertake  that  any  supplementary  policy  pursued  at  domestic  level  would  be 
subsidiary and non-conflicting with OFSAT's policies. The study considered, however, that 
these aims were unlikely to be achieved in the short term. 
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The paper considered 3 possible methods for creating OFSAT: 
•  an international convention; 
•  through the Council of Europe; or 
•  through the European Commission; 
and concluded that the third option was the most viable. 
(1)  this is seen as the ideal solution, but "would be impractical in  the short term because it 
would probably take many years to draft and agree a convention acceptable to even a few of 
the developed European countries" 
(2)  this would have the advantage of being constituted by an organisation which has as 
its members almost all European States, and being a pre-existing organisation, the 
process of considering and recommending the establishment of OFSAT might be far 
quicker than under a separate international convention. But, "the  Council of Europe 
does not have this power to force its members to adopt its recommendations.  The submission 
of  members to Council of  Europe recommendations is optional.  Thus, even if  the Council of 
Europe were to establish OFSAT and recommend that members submit to its jurisdiction .. .it 
would still  be  up  to  the  various  member countries  to  decide  whether or not  to  ratify  the 
establishment of  OFSAT' 
(3)  the Study alludes to (without detailing) the potential legal problems of establishing 
the body under the EC  Treaty, and concludes that, despite these difficulties the 
Community could provide an environment in which OFSAT could be established, 
"having realistic powers  to regulate and influence satellite policy as it extends  to Member 
States.  Furthermore,  OFSAT could  be  established  in  a relatively  short  timeframe  thus 
enabling it to  begin  to  operate  quickly enough  to  have a genuine  impact on  the  pressing 
problems of  satellite policy  .. .it may be possible to establish an OFSAT within the EC which 
could,  at a later  stage,  be extended  to  embrace  other European  countries .. .lt would be far 
easier to persuade countries to join and submit to  the jurisdiction of  an  OFSAT once they 
have had an opportunity to assess the benefits of  it as it operates within the EEC." 
An OFSAT established by the Commission could take the form of an advisory agency which 
makes recommendations to the Commission for the Commission to implement through its 
existing powers (similar to the EEA). The disadvantage of this is that the time taken for a 
policy to be implemented will be very long given the Commission's constraints of time and 
resources.  A  better  alternative  may  be  to  establish  a  separate  EC  body  which  is 
independently funded and would have its own executive powers. This might have the 
advantage of being the kind of body which could be extended to admit other countries 
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which do not wish the EC but which would wish to submit to a standard European satellite 
policy. 
Within OFSAT  itseH,  it would need to be governed by a  management committee.  This 
should be made up of the Directors General of the telecommunications regulatory bodies in 
each Member State together with 2 Commission appointees. OFSAT would have its own 
Director General, answering to the management committee, and its own staff. 
The Study may therefore provide some useful insights into the consideration of the form 
and functions of a European Regulatory Authority. 
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APPENDIX7.  COVINGTON & BURLING REPORT ON 
FEDERALISM IN UNITED STATES 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
1.  Introduction 
The  American  experience  with  dual  federal  and  state  sovereignty  in  the  area  of 
telecommunications provides a good example of the efficiencies gained and conflicts created 
by a strong federal regulatory presence.  The balance between state and federal power has 
tipped  ever  more  toward  the  federal  side  as  telecommunications  technologies  have 
advanced and converged.  In part, this is because the interstate network becomes less 
amenable to state and local regulation as it becomes more integrated and intricate.  In part, 
it is because the stronger federal interest in promoting competition creates more areas for 
federal intervention as technologies proliferate.  Of course, increased competition, to some 
extent, also supplants some regulation of any kind, thus serving to check the expansion of 
federal regulatory power. 
Over  the  past  sixty  years,  the  US  federal  government  has  asserted  control  in  the 
telecommunications arena on the basis of two related notions: 
•  that the federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce and the 
duty to ensure an efficient telecommunications network; and 
•  that the federal government is responsible for managing certain national resources 
(e.g., spectrum). 
The exercise of federal power has increasingly eroded traditional bulwarks of state authority 
such as the regulation of facilities siting, zoning, intrastate traffic, and consumer protection. 
This paper examines some examples of how federal pre-emption has been used in relation 
to  advancing  technology,  including  new  exercises  of  federal  power  under  the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.4  Section 2 examines the formation of, and rationale for, 
the Federal Communications Commission, consistent with the preservation of the 50 states' 
separate regulatory spheres of the states and territories.  It then provides a brief overview of 
the regulation of different communications sectors.  Section 3 examines the evolution of 
federal pre-emption of state regulatory authority.  Finally, Section 4 examines the most 
4  This paper builds on recent studies submitted to the European Commission on the division of federal and state 
authority in US telecommunications: Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, ~~Multilevel Regulation of Telecommunications: 
The Experience of the United States, Canada and Australia"  (December 1995)  (hereinafter, "WCP'') and Ingo 
Vogelsang,  "Federal  Versus  State  Regulation  in  US  Telecommunications"  (October  1994)  (hereinafter, 
"Vogelsang"). 
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substantial effects of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the federal power to regulate 
telecommunications. 
2.  Basic Division of Federal and State Authority in Communications 
Regulation 
2.1.  The Origins of the Dual Regulatory Structure and Distribution of Power 
On February 26,  1934,  President Franklin D.  Roosevelt urged Congress to create a  new, 
independent federal agency called the Federal Communications Commission (FCC"),s with 
the authority to regulate both the radio waves and the wirelines, then regulated separately 
by two other agencies.6  Congress did so in the Communications Act of 1934  that, as 
amended, continues to govern telecommunications and broadcasting in the US7  In enacting 
this  statute,  Congress  had the  power  to  endow the federal  agency  with far-reaching 
authority to regulate the conduct of telecommunications service providers.  The source of 
Congress' power, in this respect as in all others, is the US Constitution, which tells Congress 
what it can  regulate  and  the  extent  to  which  those  regulations  may  pre-empt  state 
regulations on the same subject.  Although the federal structure of government as a whole is 
relevant to interpretation of Congressional power, three provisions are particularly relevant: 
the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. 
The Constitution's Tenth Amendment provides that the individual states retain all powers 
not expressly given to the federal government.  Despite this apparent interest in preserving 
state sovereignty, the states' constitutionally protected province of exclusive authority is, in 
modem practice, quite small.  This is because the Constitution's Commerce Clause, which 
empowers Congress ''to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States,''s  has been construed very broadly to nearly overwhelm the Tenth Amendment's 
preserve.  US  Supreme Court decisions  dating from the mid-1930s  have relied on the 
Commerce Oause to justify the federal government's entry into myriad, seemingly local, 
activities on the grounds that such activities have spillover effects (direct or indirect) on 
interstate commerce.  These decisions have interpreted the meanings of both commerce and 
interstate commerce expansively.9  Many telecommunications activities are quintessentially 
interstate activities, but others (a decreasing number) are not and, as discussed below, the 
As an independent agency, the FCC is not part of the Executive branch and its leadership is bi-partisan (two 
commissioners each appointed from the Democratic and Republican parties, and a chairman appointed from the 
president's party). 
Federal regulatory authority over radio was vested in the Federal Radio Commission by the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 
169, Section 1, 44  Stat. 1162.  Federal regulatory authority to set interstate rates was vested in the Interstate 
Commerce Commission by the Mann-Elkins Act,  ch.  309,  Section 7,  36 Stat.  539,  544-45  (1910)  (repealed by 
Communications Act of 1934). 
7  Pub. L. No. 73-416,48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at47 U.S.C. "151-610). 
9 
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line between interstate and intrastate activities in this field has been particularly hard to 
draw.1o 
The second constitutional provision relevant to  the exercise  of federal  authority is the 
Supremacy Clause, which empowers· Congress ·and; as construed by the courts, federal 
agencies acting within their statutory authority, to pre-empt state law.n  Pre-emption may 
occur in a number of different situations: when Congress expresses a clear intent to pre-
empt state law,  when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, 
where compliance with both federal and state law is physically impossible, where there is 
implicit in federal  law a  barrier to state regulation, where Congress  has  legislated so 
comprehensively as to occupy an entire field of regulation, or where the state law opposes 
the execution  of Congress'  objectives.12  The  federal  government has  relied  especially 
heavily on the incompatibility of state and federal regulations and on the state regulations' 
obstruction of federal objectives in pre-empting state communications regulation. 
In creating the FCC,  Congress endowed the agency with relatively moderate powers of 
regulation and pre-emption and stopped short of exploiting the full measure of the federal 
control permitted by the Constitution. Section 1 of the Communications Act creates the FCC 
for the expansive purpose of overseeing the development of "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, 
and  world-wide  wire  and  radio  communication  service  with  adequate  facilities  at 
reasonable charges." 47 U.S.C.' 151.  Accordingly, Section 2(a) specifically grants to the FCC 
the  authority  to  regulate  "interstate  and  foreign  commerce  in  wire  and  radio 
communication."  47 U.S.C. ' 152(a).  However, Section 2(b) contracts what would otherwise 
appear to be very expansive powers by expressly  denying the FCC  "jurisdiction with 
respect to . . . charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in 
connection with intrastate communications service by wire or radio of any carrier."  47 
U.S.C.' 152(b) (emphasis added). 
The apparent tug between federal and state authority embodied in the Communications Act 
has worked out very differently in the telephony and radio areas due to the different 
natures of telephonic and radio transmissions.  From 1934 on, wireline telephony providers 
were  common  carriers  - traditional  subjects  of  state  control.13  However,  radio 
10  See generally, WCP, 36-85, and Vogelsang. 
n  Article VI of the Constitution provides that: 
this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,  and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of  the United States, shall be the supreme law of  the Land; and 
the judges in every States shall be bound thereby ... 
12  The various grounds of pre-emption are enumerated and explored in Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 
476 US 355 (1986), a case limiting federal pre-emption in the area of  prescribing telephone plant and equipment 
depreciation practices for intrastate ratemaking purposes. 
13  The meaning of the term common carrier was so well defined at common law in 1934 as a carrier that holds itself 
out to the public for hire on general terms, that the Communications Act merely defined the term by reference to 
itself: "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio." 
47 u.s.c. I  153(h), 
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communications  services  largely  transmitted  one-way  broadcasts  and  these  not  on  a 
common carriage basis.  States had little experience regulating such activities.  Moreover, 
the poorly understood nature of radio wave propagation was reckoned to be inherently 
interstate.  For these reasons, radio transmissions came to be regulated under Title m of the 
Communications Act, which lacks the constraint on federal power that Section 2(b) imposes 
under Title IT with respect to intrastate communications.14  Thus, radio transmissions were 
subjected  almost exclusively to federal jurisdiction.  With respect to telephony, on the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has noted that Title II of "the Act would seem to divide the 
world of domestic telephone service neatly into two hemispheres -. one comprised of 
interstate service, over which the FCC would have plenary authority, and the other made 
up intrastate service, over which the states would retain exclusive jurisdiction."15 
To gain insight into the Communications Act's original division of labour, it is important to 
understand the communications environment of 1934 and differences between wireline and 
radio services.  Local telephone service constituted about 98% of the total and states were its 
primary regulators.16  Prior to the creation of the FCC, the agency responsible for federal 
telecommunications regulation was preoccupied with regulating railroads and saw little 
need to enter with as much force into this largely local industry  .11 With the creation of the 
FCC, the federal government assumed a great deal of the regulatory responsibility, but the 
Communications  Act  clearly  recognised  and  preserved  some  of  the  states'  existing 
authority  .18 
On  the  other  hand,  the  federal  government  by  1934  had  already  gained  significant 
experience in regulating radio and had come  to  the conclusion that radio interference 
problems rendered radio spectrum an inherently national resource.  This federal experience 
14  The Section 2(b) check on federal jurisdiction also applies to intrastate radio communications, whether or not they 
are conducted by common carriers. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240-42 {9th Cir. 1990). 
1s  Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v.  FCC, 476 US 355, 360 {1986).  The Court continued that, "in practice, the 
realities of technology and economics belie such a clean parcelling of responsibility.  This is so because virtually all 
telephone plant that is used to provide intrastate service is also used to provide interstate service, and is thus 
conceivably within the jurisdiction of both state and federal authorities.  Moreover, because the same carriers 
provide both interstate and intrastate service, actions taken by federal and state regulators within their respective 
domains necessarily affect the general financial health of those carriers, and hence their ability to provide service, 
in the other 'hemisphere."' ld. 
16  See Eli M.  Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: the Effects of Deregulation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 
949, 954 {1983). 
17  See Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulations, in A Legislative 
History of the Communications Act of  1934, at 3 {Max D. Paglin ed. 1989). 
ts  It must be noted that many of the Communications Act's nods to  state authority are merely precatory and 
procedural.  The Act devised a complex procedure for separating a telecommunications carrier's property into 
intrastate and interstate uses, so that states could play a regulatory role.  47 U.S.C. 
1  221.  However, it is the FCC 
that may classify property and prescribe depreciation charges.  It may, but need not, defer to state methods, 
although  it must at least  notify  and consult with state commissions  before  promulgating accounting  and 
depreciation regulations.  47 U.S.C.  I  220.  Another section, which was added in 1971, provides for joint state-
federal boards to resolve regulatory issues of joint concern, although the FCC is empowered to make the ultimate 
decision.  47 U.S.C. '410. See generally, Vogelsang at 23-31. 
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began with the Radio Act of 1912, the first piece of domestic legislation to reduce destructive 
interference among government, commercial, and amateur radio users.19  The 1912 Act's 
provision of federal power in this area, though novel, was very modest  For example, the 
licensing authority had no power to deny a license on the ground that the proposed station 
would interfere with existing. stations.~  Moreover, according to· a  1926 decision by the 
Court of Appeals for  the D.C.  Circuit,  this  authority could not impose  restrictions  on 
frequency, power, and hours of operation and could not prevent a station from using a 
frequency not assigned to it.2t  Radio chaos ensued. 
The Radio Act of 1927, the precursor to the Communications Act of 1934, was enacted to fill 
this power vacuum and "to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of 
interstate  and foreign  radio  transmission."22  With respect to the distribution  of  radio 
licenses among "the different states and communities," the Federal Radio Commission was 
charged to II give fair, efficient, equitable radio service to each of the same."23 Commenting 
on the legislation, one of the first Commissioners noted: 
Congress has  grasped the significance of radio as a vital force in American life and has 
recently enacted a  law which in many ways is absolutely unique.  I know of no other 
activity, conducted entirely through private enterprise which has seemed to Congress so 
important and so complex in its problems as to require the creation of a new and separate 
branch of government exclusively for its regulation.24 
On the basis of this experience, Title ill of the Communications Act vested the FCC with 
exclusive jurisdiction to allocate radio frequencies  to various uses and grant licenses  to 
various users.25  Outside of content restrictions (e.g.  libel, privacy, consumer protection), 
states have no significant responsibilities in  the broadcasting and satellite transmission area, 
except to the extent that land use issues are implicated.  Until recently, states played a 
19  Act of August 13, 1912, ch. 2/,7, 37 Stat. 302. 
20  The Radio Act of 1912 made a license necessary for the operation of a radio service, but required the Secretary of 
Commerce to issue licenses to all applicants.  See Hoover v. Intercity Radio, 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring 
the Secretary to grant a renewal of a license to the Intercity Radio Company even though such renewal would 





See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1926); see also Opinion of Acting Attorney General 
Donovan that the Secretary of Commerce had no power, under the Radio Act of 1912, to so regulate stations.  35 
Ops. Atty. Gen. 126 Ouly 8, 1926). 
P.L. 69-632, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).  The Act established the Federal Radio Commission and required it to "(a) 
classify radio stations; (b) prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and 
each station within any class and each station within any class; (c) assign bands of frequencies or wave lengths to 
the various classes of stations [and] ...  for each individual station." Id., at Section 4.  The Communications Act 
subsequently assigned the same duties to the FCC. 
ld. at Section 9. 
Address of Commissioner Henry A.  Bellows before the League of Women Voters, April 1927.  Quoted in, J. 
Robinson, Spectrum Management Policy in the United States: An Historical Account (Federal Communications 
Commission OPP Working Paper Series, April1995) at 21. 
25  See 47 U.S.C. ' 303.  See generally, WCP at 46-52. 
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greater role in  the :regulation of common carriage by radio, but, as discussed below, this role 
is now much diminished. 
2.2.  An Overview of Sectoral Regulation 
As  background  for  Section  3'  s  pre-emption  discussion,  this  section  provides  a  brief 
overview of communications regulation in the various communications industries.  The 
FCC's primary responsibilities are to regulate telephony (wireline and mobile), cable and 
broadcasting. The states have had major responsibilities in the first two areas, but far less in 
the  third  area.  Such  state  responsibilities  for  mobile  telephony  have  been  reduced 
substantially,  while  state  autonomy  in  regulating  wireline  telephony  was  narrowed 
considerably by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
2.21.  Telephony 
The US telephone industry has three major components: 
•  local fixed line phone service is provided in a particular geographic area for which 
the customer does not have to pay a per-call or per-minute toll (generally, but not 
always, intrastate);26 
•  long distance phone service (may be intrastate or interstate);27 and 
•  mobile communications.2B 
Local  phone service is regulated in price,  terms and conditions by each of the states' 
regulatory commissions and by the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau (with input from the 
Department of Justice in some cases).  Long distance service, primarily regulated by the 
Common Carrier Bureau, has not been regulated as heavily as has local phone service since 
the 1984  break-up of AT&T  because long distance service has  been more competitive. 
Mobile communications, primarily regulated by the FCC's Wireless Telecommunications 
Bureau and Common Carrier Bureau, is regulated least of all because it has been more 
competitive and deemed, by the FCC, ancillary to basic wireline telephone service. 
26  The most prominent companies in the $100 billion local telephone market are the seven regional Bell operating 
companies (BellSouth, NYNEX,  Bell Atlantic, Pacific Bell,  US West, Ameritech, and SBC Communications), and 
GTE. 
27  Long distance companies include AT&T,  MCI, and Sprint, which together control over 80%  of this $70 billion 
annual market. 
28  Mobile companies include AT&T (McCaw), AirTouch, Sprint Spectrum and the mobile communications affiliates 
of the local phone companies. 
46 Appendix 7: Federalism in United States Telecommunications 
2.2.1.1. Wireline Telephony 
Prior to the 1996  Act,  the 1982  AT&T  Divestiture Consent Decree  (the  Modified Final 
Judgement or "MFJ") established a regulatory structure based on the principle that long 
distance and equipment markets should be opened, competition in those markets should be 
encouraged, and monopolies should be regulated by replicating the effects of competition. 
The profitable and infrastructure-intensive local loop was conceded to be, as a practical 
matter,  the  exclusive  domain  of  the  local  exchange  carrier  ("LEC"),  subject  to  price 
regulation set by the FCC and state commissions.  State commissions generally set higher 
rates for business services, intrastate toll, and enhanced services than for basic residential 
local exchange services and subsidies generally flowed from long distance to local service.29 
The MFJ  Consent Decree opened the long distance market for competition by ensuring 
equal access  to customers and local telephone company facilities  by placing additional 
regulatory burdens on AT&T (which until1995 was deemed to have a uniquely dominant 
position).  The FCC built on the competitive spirit of the MFJ by expanding unbundling and 
interconnection obligations.30  It required regional Bell  operating companies  ("RBOCs") 
were to unbundle their network elements so that competitors could purchase these elements 
as they chose.3t  It further required RBOCs to interconnect with emerging competitors in 
their local markets.32  Each of these requirements pre-empted state regulations on the same 
subject and further marginalised the state's role.  As discussed in Section 4, below, the 1996 
Act dissolves the MFJ Consent Decree structure py seeking to ease entry of the regional Bell 
operating companies ("RBOC"), long distance companies and cable companies into each 
other's businesses, subject to certain safeguards, and by expressly providing for expanded 
interconnection and facilities collocation. 
2.2.1.2. Mobile Telephony 
Mobile  telephone services  are broadly classified  as Commercial Mobile  Radio  Services 
("CMRS") and, to a much lesser extent, Private Mobile Radio Services.  CMRS also includes 
licensed services such as paging, satellite services, Specialised Mobile Radio, cellular, and 
Personal Communications Systems ("PCS").  It  also includes unlicensed PCS services, which 
can be used for wireless private exchange and local loop access.  Since the US adopted a law 
in 1993 to largely deregulate CMRS providers (see Section 3.2. below), the central regulatory 
issues for mobile and satellite services have been: 
•  the functioning of auctions as an assignment methodology; and 
29  See Vogelsang at 81-82. 
30  See generally, WCP at 57-63. 
31  Amendment of' 64.702 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations (Third Computer Industry or Computer III), 104 
FCC 2d 958 (1986), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990). 
32  Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, 9 FCC Red. 5154 (1994). 
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•  interconnection terms and rates with LECs. 
Sorting out the proper relationship between CMRS providers and LECs has been essential to 
the development of mobile telephony and the possibility of competition in the provision of 
local telephone service.  The existence of competitive mobile telephony services has hinged 
on the degree  to which RBOCs  would be able to use their unique access  to  customer 
proprietary network information, infrastructure, and bottleneck facilities to gain advantage 
in the mobile markets.  The wireline companies gained a head start in cellular in the early 
1980s by obtaining free licenses for the provision of regional service through guaranteed set-
asides, with little or no delay due to litigation.  To  keep RBOCs  from leveraging their 
position in the local loop market, the FCC imposed an in-region RBOC-cellular structural 
separation rule. 
In turn, the FCC acted to prevent cellular companies from leveraging their positions to gain 
advantage in new markets opened up in the mid-1990s when the FCC auctioned licenses for 
the provision of digital CMRS - narrowband and broadband PCS.33  To prevent the cellular 
companies from  gaining undue advantage and ensure robust competition in PCS,  the 
Commission limited the initial participation of the cellular providers.34  It also structured 
some license auctions so that smaller companies would have a chance to bid for smaller 
license areas. 
As discussed further in Section 4 below, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 defined the 
interconnection obligations of incumbent LECs.  RBOCs are required to allow cellular and 
PCS services to interconnect with wireline facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.  CMRS 
providers generally are not subject to the interconnection and unbundling requirements to 
which wireline providers are subject, leaving CMRS providers free to continue to bundle 
equipment and services. 
22.2.  Cable 
What  are  colloquially  referred  to  as  cable  services  consist  of  multichannel  video 
programming  distributors  operating  on  closed  transmission  path  facilities  (nam~ly 
traditional hard-wire cable television and satellite master antenna TV  (used in apartment 
buildings)), regulated by the FCC's Cable Services Bureau, and those operating on open 
transmission  path facilities,  such  as  wireless  cable  (a  subscription  service  transmitted 
terrestrially over microwave frequencies) and direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"), which are 
regulated respectively by the FCC's  Mass  Media Bureau and the International Bureau. 
Hard-wire cable systems are also subject to the requirements of local franchises.  Satellite 
33  Narrowband PCS is essentially a two-way paging service that can carry small amounts of data.  Broadband PCS 
can carry voice and high-speed data, competes with cellular and has the potential to compete with local wireline 
telephony. 
34  The FCC's attribution rules using 20% ownership of a cellular licensee as the point at which the entity would be 
restricted from bidding on PCS licenses were struck down as arbitrary and capricious in Cincinnati Bell Telephone 
Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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services are almost entirely regulated at the federal level,  although certain antenna and 
other satellite earth-station zoning restrictions may be imposed at the state or locallevel.35 
Certain federal rules apply to both closed and open path facilities, but additional regulations 
apply to hard-wire cable systems.  Cable regulation has centred on the prohibition on 
cable's.entry into.the telephony, wireless cable.and-broadcast markets, and the strictures of 
the 1992 Cable Act, which checked monopolist cable prices, mandated cable competitors' 
access to popular cable programming, required larger systems (36 or more channels) to lease 
capacity to independent programmers, and ensured that cable systems carry local broadcast 
channels, thereby sustaining broadcast television as a viable competitor to cable (subject to 
an option for  broadcasters  called  retransmission  consent).  Although  local  authorities 
responsible for granting cable franchises have been at the regulatory forefront, state laws 
have been responsible for keeping cable out of the local telephone industry  .36  As discussed 
below in Section 4, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 permits cable to enter the telephone 
business and reverses the Cable Act's price regulations in stages. 
2.2.3.  Broadcasting 
Over the past 50 years, broadcast radio and television have been regulated by the FCC's 
Mass Media Bureau on the theory that licenses to use limited spectrum carry with them the 
obligation to operate in the public interest.  This 
11 trusteeship" model provides for less First 
Amendment protection than other mass media, such as newspapers, enjoy because of the 
limited resource involved.  The public interest standard, embodied in the Communications 
Act, has resulted in ownership restrictions (for the sake of diversity), equal employment 
opportunity rules, licensee qualifications, and certain content requirements.  Also critical to 
broadcasting  regulation  has  been  the  attempt  to  preserve  balance  in the  relationship 
between national networks and local affiliates by controlling the networks' market power. 
State and local regulations come into play only with respect to certain state law content 
restrictions  and zoning and health and safety  issues  related  to  television  towers  and 
facilities. 
3.  Evolution of Federal Pre-emption Authority (and its Mixed Record) 
3.1.  The Evolution of the FCC Pre-emption Authority 
3.1.1.  The Ascendancy of  Pre-emption Power 
The waxing and waning of the exercise of federal pre-emption power has been a factor of 
technological developments and competition.  Most experts observe that until the late 1960s, 
federal  and state telecommunications  goals were congruent and the division of labour 
relatively harmonious.37  The regulatory authorities agreed that the highest priority should 
35  The FCC has recently pre-empted some of this regulation.  See In re Pre-emption of Local Zoning Regulation of 
Satellite Earth Stations, FCC No. 96-78 (March 11, 1996). 
36  See generally, WCP at 72-74. 
37  See generally, WCP at 77-78; Vogelsang at 24-28. 
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be to provide universal service, requiring business and long distance users to subsidise 
lower  residential  local  rates.  They  also  agreed  that  "natural"  telecommunications 
monopolies were necessary and thus erected a regime to regulate a package of local service 
and customer equipment (tariffed in a single bundle) and long-distance service.38 
As  technologies advanced with the advent of microwave, satellites and computers,  the 
national network the FCC was created to foster became more complicated and competition 
both more essential and more likely.  Beginning in the late 1960s ·and reaching a climax ill 
1996, the FCC has pursued a policy based on a belief that increased competition and the 
unbundled  provision  of  services  would  best  serve  the  public  interest.  Some  state 
commissions, such as the New York and lllinois Public Utility Commissions have been in 
front of the FCC, seeking to introduce competition to local telephone service early on.  39 
However, many more have implemented policies designed to ensure low cost and universal 
access to residential and small business customers at the expense of competition.40 
The first major showdown between the federal and state exercise of regulatory authority 
occurred in the area of customer-premises equipment ("CPE").  In 1968, in its Carterfone 
decision,41  the FCC invalidated a tariff that allowed only CPE provided by the telephone 
company to be connected to that telephone company's facilities.42  It did so in the name of 
fostering competition in the provision of telephone equipment.  In 197  4, the FCC responded 
38  See, e.g., Kellogg, et al., Federal Telecommunications Law 92 (1992). 
39  See, e.g., Regulatory Policies for Segments of the Telecommunications Industry Subject to Competition, 103 Pub. 
Util. Rep. 1 (N.Y.P.U.C. 1989). 
40  To this end, a  number of states (e.g.,  Virginia,  North Carolina,  New Jersey,  Florida,  Georgia)  until recently 
prohibited competition with the local telephone company.  See generally Loeb, "The Communications Act Policy 
Toward Competition: A Failure to Communicate," 1978  Duke L.J.1,  5-16;  Noam, ''Federal and State Roles  in 
Telecommunications: The Effects of Deregulation," 36 Vand. L.  Rev.  949,  956-7 (1983);  Bewig, Federalism and 
Telecommunications: On the Right Wavelength?", 59 George Washington L. Rev. 1190,1216 (1991). 
There are several examples of states' interest in benefiting smaller customers at the expense of competition and 
advanced technologies.  The court in Public Utility Commission of Texas v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
upheld the FCC's pre-emption of a state rule which would have prevented a major oil company from using its 
own private microwave transmission network to access the public switched network via its own choice of public 
trunk line providers, rather than the trunk line provider assigned to it under the state's plan. 
The FCC touted its policy as benefiting large business enterprises with extensive microwave systems, while the 
Texas PUC argued that the result would be higher rates for smaller customers.  At issue in Louisiana Public 
Service Commission v.  FCC,  476  US  355  (1986)  were differing federal and state approaches to the setting of 
depreciation rates to be used  for intrastate ratemaking  The FCC favoured higher depreciation rates so as to 
encourage phone companies to contribute to a superior network by investing in new plant and equipment.  State 
regulators preferred lower depreciation rates so as to keep intrastate rates low.  The Court held that there was no 
cause for federal pre-emption and that the states could set depreciation rates for intrastate communications. 
41  Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services, 13 FCC 2d 420, recon. denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 
(1968). 
42  Twelve years earlier, the Court of Appeals for  the District of Columbia Circuit overturned an FCC  foreign-
attachment tariff prohibiting the use of a device to provide a quiet circuit.  The court declared that the telephone 
customer has a  "right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being 
publicly detrimental."  Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
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to a number of state rulings banning interconnection of CPE to their respective intrastate 
telephone systems on the theory that the goal of universal service would be undermined if 
the telephone company lost CPE revenue.  The FCC pre-empted all state regulation of CPE 
that conflicted with FCC policy, arguing that telephone equipment was necessarily used for 
all local and long- distance telephone calls, and  .. conflicting state law would frustrate the 
FCC's attempt to engender competition in the CPE market.43 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC's position in a decision that was to 
set pre-emption policy for the next decade.  In North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC 
(NCUC I),  the court held that Section 2(b)  of the Communications Act (which reserves 
intrastate rate regulation to the states) only restrains the FCC from regulating matters "that 
in their nature and effect are separable from and do not substantially affect the conduct or 
development of interstate communications."44  What became known as the NCUC I rule 
authorised FCC pre-emption unless the state could show that the matter could be regulated 
separately by federal and state authorities and that state regulation would not substantially 
affect interstate communications.45  Put affirmatively, the FCC could pre-empt if  federal and 
state interests are inseparable or state regulation substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Because the NCUC I court recognised that 97% of all CPE use was for intrastate calls, the 
NCUC I rule implicitly rejected an allocation of federal and state responsibilities based on 
the volume of calls in each domain.  Because some federal interest was implicated in each 
use of CPE, the FCC "must remain free to determine what terminal equipment can safely 
and advantageously be interconnected with the interstate Communications network and 
how this shall be done."46  The federal policy of fostering competition in the interstate 
network thus gained predominance over the state's interest in controlling activities within 
its borders and the stage was set for widespread federal pre-emption.47 
In 1980,  the FCC  took its  position on CPE  one step further  and pre-empted all state 
regulation of CPE  so that charges for CPE would no longer be bundled and would be 
entirely separate from charges for transmission service.  The FCC also decided that the use 
of computers to perform circuit switching or data processing (enhanced services), although 
not part of  the  basic  telephone  service  and therefore  beyond the  scope  of  traditional 
common  carrier  regulation,  could  be  regulated  by  the  FCC  pursuant  to  its  ancillary 
43  See Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 FCC 2d 204,215-220 (1974). 
44  537 F.2d. 787, 793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 US 1027 (1976). 
45  The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the NCUC I rule in North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC (NCUC ll), 552 F  .2d 
1036  (4th Cir.),  cert.  denied, 434  US  874  (1977)  (upholding the FCCs jurisdiction to regulate even intrastate 
facilities used "predominantly" for local communication). 
46  Id. at 1043. 
47  See, e.g., Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding FCC pre-
emption of regulation of CPE used in interstate and intrastate communications), cert. denied, 461 US 938 (1983); 
New York Tel. Co. v. FCC,  631  F.2d 1059 (2d  Cir. 1980)  (upholding FCC pre-emption of regulation of  local 
exchange service  used in connection with  interstate foreign  exchanges  and common-switching arrangement 
services); California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84  (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding FCC pre-emption of regulation of foreign-
exchange and common-switching arrangement facilities), cert. denied, 434 US 1010 (1978). 
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jurisdiction to regulate the interstate network.  Here again, in the face of new technology 
that could hinder or support the competitiveness of the network, the FCC acted to pre-empt 
contrary state regulation.48 
The District of Columbia  ·Circuit upheld  ·the FCC's pre-emption decisions on the ground that 
conflicting state regulation would frustrate the FCCs statutory duty.49  Dismissing the 
argument that by deregulating, the FCC lost its pre-emption power, the court came to the 
important  conclusion  that  deregulation  was  tantamount  to  "a  different,  affirmative 
regulatory  scheme  [created]  through  [the  FCC's]  ancillary  jurisdiction."so  Thus,  this 
decision  framed  the  FCC  s  actions  narrowly  and  the  interstate  component  of 
telecommunications broadly.  Because the FCC had not actually set local rates, it was not 
usurping  the  ratemaking  authority  reserved  to  the  states.  Because  the  interest  in a 
competitive interstate network was so strong, the FCC  s choice to deregulate in furtherance 
of this interest was as controlling as a choice to regulate would have been. 
In the cable area,st this exercise of the federal pre-emption power in the name of a nation-
wide network subordinated one of the key components of local regulatory power - the 
power to enact zoning regulations.  In New York State Commission on Cable Television v. 
FCC,s2 the court upheld the FCC  s pre-emption of state regulation that interfered with the 
public's reception of Multipoint Distribution Service  ("MDS")  transmissions.  The  FCC 
argued that New York's regulation of master antenna television cable systems would chill 
the development of MDS.  New York asserted that any impediment would be to intrastate 
transmissions only.  The Court of  Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that MDS 
"transmissions cannot ...  be split into interstate and intrastate components" and, therefore, 
the FCC could exercise its pre-emption power.53 
Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's broad pre-emption powers in the 
cable  area in Capital Cities Cable,  Inc.  v.  Crisp.54  In this  case,  the FCC  had granted 
Oklahoma  cable  operators'  petition  for  injunctive  relief  from  an Oklahoma  law  that 
criminalised the broadcasting of alcohol  advertisements.  The Court upheld the FCC's 
48  Amendment  of Section  64.702  of the  Commission's  Rules  and  Regulations  (Second  Computer  Inquiry  or 
Computer ll), 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980). 
49  Computer and Communications Industries Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471  US 938 
(1983). 
so  Id. at 217. 
51  The Supreme Court first  upheld  the FCC's  jurisdiction  over cable TV  on the basis  of the FCC's  ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate new technologies.  United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157 (1968). 
52  669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982). 
53  See id. at 65-66.  See also New York State Comm'n. on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(upholding FCC's pre-emption of state regulation of en  by into satellite master antenna television because such 
state regulation conflicted with the FCC  s policies). 
54  467 us 691 (1984). 
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power  to  pre-empt  such  state  regulation  to  ensure  that  "'the  benefits  of  cable 
communications become a reality on a nation-wide basis."'  55 
3.1.2.  The Moderation of  FCC Pre-emption Authority 
In Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC,56 the Supreme Court modified the NCUC I rule to 
restrict the FCC's pre-emption power.  It did this by replacing the "or" in the NCUC I rule 
(matter is inseparable or affects interstate communications) to an "and" so that pre-emption 
would permitted only when interstate and intrastate services  are inseparable and state 
regulation impedes the FCC's exercise of its statutory authority.  57  Louisiana PSC was about 
depreciation rules for telecommunications equipment and the extent to which states and the 
FCC could have varying rules.  The FCC relied on a provision of the Communications Act 
that  required  the  FCC  to  "prescribe  for  [carriers]  the  classes  of  property  for  which 
depreciation  charges  may  be  properly  included  under  operating  expenses,  and  the 
percentages of depreciation which shall be charged with respect to each of such classes of 
property,"ss and argued that state depreciation rates that did not permit capital recovery 
would frustrate the FCC's promotion of a competitive environment.  The Supreme Court 
rejected  this  argument because  interstate  and intrastate  costs  could  be  separated  and 
different rates of depreciation could be applied in the state and federal spheres.  59 
3.1.3.  The Recent Course of  Federal Pre-emption 
Two things became clear in the cases decided after Louisiana PSC.  First, discriminating 
separable  from  inseparable  intrastate  and  interstate  communications  matters  is  very 
difficult.  Second,  technological  advances  may well allow  separation of intrastate  and 
interstate traffic and rates that were once inseparable.  The following are the recent pre-
emption decisions in the wake of Louisiana PSC, followed by a discussion. 
In Favour of Pre-emption: 
•  The  FCC  attempted  to  pre-empt  Hawaii's  implementation  of  its  own method, 
contrary to the FCC's, of separating interstate and intrastate rate bases.  The court 
ruled that this pre-emption was permissible because ratebase separation is a single 
55  ld. at 708 (quoting 47 U.S.C.' 151).  See also New York State Commission on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 
(D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (affirming FCC order pre-empting state and local entry regulation of satellite master antenna 
television); Evans v.  Board of County Commissioners of the County of Boulder, 994 F.2d 755 {lOth Cir. 1993) 
{holding local zoning regulation did not violate FCC order pre-empting specific antenna height limitations, but 
that nay local ordinance which absolutely prohibits antennas over a certain height is pre-empted). 
56  476 us 355 (1986). 
57  476 US at 375. 
58  47 u.s.c. I  220{b). 
59  476 US at 371. 
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(inseparable)  activity  within  the  FCC's  exclusive  jurisdiction  under  the 
Communications Act.60 
•  The FCC  attempted to pre-empt Dlinois'  regulation of the marketing of Centrex 
(private exchange) services.  The court affirmed.  It held that even though Centrex 
may have been a purely intrastate service, it was typically sold in a package with 
interstate  services  and,  thus,  "[m]arketing  realities  might  themselves  create 
inseparability  ."61 
•  The FCC attempted to pre-empt Texas' enforcement of its LEC franchise boundaries 
against the will of an oil company's attempt to use an alternative LEC.  The court 
affirmed the FCC decision on the grounds that the lines in question would handle 
both interstate and intrastate calls.  Because it was impossible for the favoured LEC 
to block intrastate calls over its line, thus avoiding state regulation, pre-emption was 
appropriate.  62 
•  The FCC attempted to pre-empt Maryland's regulation of the rates a local phone 
company may charge interstate carriers to disconnect customers for non-payment. 
The  court  upheld  the  pre-emption  on  the  grounds  that  disconnection  affects 
intrastate and interstate calls  equally  and that state  regulation of disconnection 
would enable them to subsidise local service, against FCC policies.  63 
•  The  FCC  attempted to  pre-empt California  from imposing structural separation 
requirements on RBOCs with respect to enhanced services.  The court held that some 
state regulation of intrastate enhanced services (such as voice mail) could coexist 
with the federal policy.64  The case was remanded to the FCC and the facts of the 
case were further developed.  Ultimately, the court upheld the FCC's decision that 
separation requirements for intrastate services would effectively impose separation 
requirements for interstate services.  65 
•  The FCC attempted to pre-empt California from imposing a rule that would have 
required  a  default  Caller-Identification  blocking  service  (for  non-published 
subscribers that do not express a choice of a system to prevent disclosure of their 
telephone number to a called party) the California rule would have reduced the 
60  Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. PUC of Hawaii, 827 F2d 1264 (9th Cir.1987). 
61  illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 883 F2d 104,113 n.7 (D.C. Cir.1989). 
62  Public Utility Commission of  Texas v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
63  Public Utility Commission of Maryland v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510 (D.C. Cir.1990). 
64  California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.1990). 
65  California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1427 (1995).  See  Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service, 9 
FCC Red. 1764 (1994). 
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number of caller-identifications that could be made in California.  The court affirmed 
the FCC's reasoning that pre-emption was necessary to permit 
11 the residents of, and 
callers to, [California to access] the benefits we have determined in this proceeding 
are associated with such interstate [Caller-Identification] services" and so enable the 
FCC to accomplish the objectives  ·Of. its federal model.  66 
•  Recently, the FCC has issued a number of pre-emption rulings which either have not 
been appealed or have been summarily affirmed.67  It has pre-empted the application 
of state entry requirements and other regulations to the intrastate use of a paging 
service  on the grounds that the  paging service  at issue  could not differentiate 
intrastate and interstate pages.  Importantly, the FCC limited the scope of its ruling 
to  paging  systems  that  cannot  so  discriminate.68  It has  pre-empted  a  state 
requirement for a preamble to 900-number information services that conflicted with 
the federally required preamble, finding it impossible to separate the intrastate and 
interstate components of the services.  Again the FCC noted that if  a provider could 
technically comply with conflicting preamble requirements, there would be no pre-
emption.69  It pre-empted a  state's  prohibition of intrastate  voice  mail  services 
because such services could receive interstate calls.  70 
Against Pre-emption: 
•  The FCC  attempted to pre-empt California's regulation of purely intrastate radio 
common carrier services, although it acknowledged that intrastate and interstate 
communications could be separated.  The court rejected the FCC's argument that 
restrictive  state  regulations  frustrated  its  efforts  to  encourage  competition  and 
spectrum efficiency and overruled the pre-emption.71 
•  As it had done with CPE,  the FCC decided that the installation of inside wiring 
should be unbundled from regulated telephone service and de-tariffed.  The states 
wanted to maintain tariffs on the inside wiring.  The court sided with the states and 
held that state tariffing of the unbundled wiring would not frustrate the 
11 federal 
66  California v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350,1360 (9th Cir.1996). 
67  An additional proceeding is pending in which the FCC has proposed to pre-empt state regulations to ensure that 
enhanced 911 emergency service is compatible with all PBX equipment and wireless services.  In re. Revision of 
the Commission's Rules  to Ensure  Compatibility with Enhanced 911  Emergency  Calling Systems,  Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Red. 6170 (1994). 
68  Mobile Telecommunications Technologies  Corporation and US  Central  Inc.,  6  FCC  Red.  1938,  aff'd by  the 
Commission, 7 FCC Red. 4061 (1992). 
69  Memorandum and Order, Petition for an Expedited Declaratory Ruling, 8 FCC Red. 698 (1993). 
70  Memorandum Opinion and Order, Petition for Emergency Relief and Declaratory Ruling,  filed  by BellSouth 
Corporation, 7 FCC Rec. 1619 (1992) aff'd per curiam, Georgia PSC v. FCC, 5 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1993). 
71  California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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policy of establishing a competitive inside wiring market" as state tariffing of CPE 
would have done.n 
•  The FCC declined to pre-empt the states' regulation interstate debit card services 
(allowing customers to pre-pay for  calls)  where intrastate use of the debit card 
existed but was incidental to the main purpose.  The FCC based its ruling on the fact 
that it was possible to separate the intrastate and interstate traffic.  73  This decision 
was  based  on  a  prior  decision  not  to  pre-empt  Connecticut  from  regulating 
unauthorised  intrastate  calls  in  the  face  of  arguments  that· this  impeded  the 
provision of interstate service.  The FCC determined that the intrastate traffic was 
not "incidental to,  or inseparable from,  the interstate traffic  in the sense of any 
physical, logical, or practical inseparability."74 
•  The decisions following Louisiana PSC clearly show that the courts are taking far 
more care to preserve state jurisdiction, although pre-emption is still common and 
still justified by the federal interests in making new technologies widely available.  It 
is safe to say that although the results have not differed wildly from what they were 
before  1986,  the  analysis  has  become  more  painstaking.  In addition,  before 
Louisiana  PSC,  the  states  generally  bore  the burden of proving separability  in 
jurisdictionally mixed cases.  It is now the FCC that bears the burden of proving 
inseparability.  As  demonstrated by the court's flip-flop  in the California  cases 
dealing  with  enhanced  services  (first  treating  them  as  separable  and  then  as 
inseparable), the separability determination is  a  very fact  specific  and uncertain 
process.  It is difficult to explain, for example, why inside wiring and CPE - both 
formerly parts of the regulated bundled telephone service - should not be treated 
the same with respect to the validity of state regulations.  The extent to which any 
communications activity will be separable, of course, depends upon the state of the 
technology.  Thus, if a paging system or 900-number information service provider 
could distinguish between interstate and intrastate calls, state regulation in these 
areas probably would not be pre-empted, as the FCC  itself has recognised in its 
recent decisions.  Thus, as technology develops, there will be increased pressure to 
assert federal jurisdiction over interstate network elements.  On the other hand, it 
may  become  increasingly  difficult  to  satisfy  the  Louisiana  PSC  pre-emption 
requirement of inseparability. 
n  NARUC v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422,429 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  The FCC is considering whether to regulate cable wiring as it 
has telephone wiring, in light of the converging uses of the two.  In re Telecommunications Services Inside Wiring; 
Consumer Premises Equipment, FCC No. 95-504 Oanuary 26, 1996). 
73  In re The Time Machine, Inc., Request for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning Pre-emption of State Regulation of 
Interstate 800-Access  Debit Card Telecommunications Services,  Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1995 FCC 
LEXIS 7290 (October 26, 1995). 
74  Petitions of MCI Telecommunications and GTE Sprint Communications Corporation Regarding the Validity of 
Connecticut Statute Relating to Unauthorised Interstate Traffic, 1 FCC Red. 270 (1986). 
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3.2  Comparison of Successful and Unsuccessful FCC Pre-emption 
Most of the federal pre-emption decisions may be credited as facilitating an increasingly 
competitive and varied communications network.  The decisions with respect to mobile 
telephony provide a  good example of this.  Beginning in 1993, there was an exertion of 
federal  jurisdiction over,  and a  deregulation of,  mobile  telephony.  Because  this  two-
pronged strategy was implemented at a time when improving technologies and increasing 
competition were making the service more desirable and affordable, the regulatory strategy 
worked in harmony with industry trends to accelerate the provision of mobile telephony 
services to the public.  On the other hand, the exertion of federal authority in the cable area, 
coupled again with deregulation, in 1984 was unsuccessful.  It came at a time when there 
was  neither  robust  competition  among  cable  companies  in  a  given  community  nor 
advanced alternative technologies capable of competing with cable.  This application of a 
regulatory strategy to an unripe commercial environment led to increased consumer cost 
and a delay in competition. 
3.2.1.  Mobile Telephony 
Mobile communications services were not very prevalent until the mid-1980s when paging 
and cellular services were licensed on a large scale.  States had been regulating entry into 
the  early paging services  which were  primarily intrastate in nature.  When  the  FCC 
allocated spectrum for nation-wide and regional paging networks, it pre-empted state entry 
regulation  that  interfered  with  this  "new,  innovative,  and  primarily  interstate 
telecommunications service."75  On the basis of its power to license radio frequency users, 
the FCC took some steps to pre-empt state regulation of the cellular market structure so as 
to encourage competition and the construction of a seamless national network.76  However, 
the courts overturned the FCC's attempts to implement a more thoroughgoing pre-emption 
of cellular entry regulation on the grounds that the states retained the right to regulate 
common carrier intrastate entry.77 
In 1993,  Congress did away with this reservation of the states' rights by establishing a 
purely federal regulatory framework for  CMRS  providers.  In the 1993  Budget Act,78  it 
amended the Communications Act to pre-empt state regulation of private mobile service or 
CMRS entry and rates and directed the FCC to auction numerous CMRS licenses.79  In so 
doing, Congress intended to end the practice of individual states exercising control over 
rates charged by a  service that is fundamentally interstate in nature.  States may seek 
authority from the FCC to regulate CMRS rates, but such regulation will be permitted only 
75  Domestic Public Land Mobile Radio Service, 93 FCC 2d 908, & 37 (1983). 
76  See Cellular Communications Systems, 86 FCC 2d 469 (1981), on recon., 89 FCC 2d 58 (1982). 
"  See NARUC v. FCC, No. 86-1205 (D.C. Cir. March 30, 1987).  See, generally, WCP at 48-51. 
78  Title VI of the Omnibus Budget Act of  1993,' 6002, 107 Stat. 387 (1993). 
19  See 47 US.C. '332(c)(3)(A) C[N]o state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the 
rates charged by any [CMRS provider] ....  )" 
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if the state can show that the service effectively substitutes for telephone service or that 
market conditions fail to protect consumers from unjust rates.  80  The 1993 Budget Act did 
preserve state authority over ''the other terms and conditions'' of CMRS service, such as 
certain "consumer protection and service quality standards."Sl  The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 did nothing to alter the FCC's exclusive jurisdiction over CMRS rates and entry. 
In addition to  circumscribing state  authority,  the 1993  Budget Act freed  a  substantial 
amount of federal government spectrum for PCS and other mobile uses, and directed the 
FCC to conduct auctions on an expedited basis for PCS.  Indeed, the promise of competition 
from  PCS  was  one  of  the  justifications  Congress  relied  upon  for  pre-empting  state 
regulation of cellular rates.  The FCC also has relied on the promise of competition from 
PCS, which is now being deployed throughout the US, in denying state petitions to regulate 
cellular rates.  The early evidence from PCS-cellular competition, which is now limited to 
the Washington, D.C.  and Hawaii markets, is that PCS does have a restraining effect on 
cellular prices. 
To  enable PCS and cellular to develop and flourish as viable competitors with wireline 
telephone service, CMRS providers need fair and efficient access to the wireline network at 
affordable rates.  The FCC recently initiated a rulemaking to implement a federal CMRS 
interconnection policy.  82  It  requested comment on three possible plans: 
•  allowing states to voluntarily accept federal guidelines for interconnection matters; 
•  adopting a mandatory federal policy which consists of general policy parameters 
while allowing states a wide range of discretion in implementing specific elements 
of these arrangements; and 
•  adopting specific, federal requirements for interstate and intrastate local exchange 
and CMRS interconnection arrangements. 
These options illustrate the constant tug in the dual world of federal and state regulation. 
The FCC has indicated its inclination to pre-empt state CMRS interconnection rules.  Such 
pre-emption  would  satisfy  the  Louisiana  PSC  test  because,  with  respect  to  mixed 
jurisdiction, allowing states to regulate the LEC  half of LEC-CMRS interconnection rates 
would make it impracticable for  the FCC  to  implement its Section 332(c)  authority to 
regulate CMRS interconnection rates.  It would frustrate the FCC's goal, as set forth by 
80  47 U.S.C. '332(c)(3)(B).  Several states have petitioned the FCC for such authority; all such petitions have been 
rejected. 
81  47 U.S.C. ' 332(c)(3)(A). 
82  See In re Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Services Providers, FCC No. 
95-505 Oanuary 11, 1996). 
58 Appendix 7: Federalism in United States Telecommunications 
Congress, to develop a seamless, national network.  83  The FCC has reasoned that adoption 
of 50 different rate policies would result in a patchwork of different regulations governing 
CMRS instead of a unified network.84  It also is highly doubtful that any critical mass of state 
commissions could act quickly enough to have effective regulations in place by the time 
broad-based PCS.roll-out begins  .. this year  .. 
Physical inseparability is present as well.  A typical CMRS user in the Washington, D.C. 
market, for example, demonstrates the inseparability of CMRS services:  Her CMRS phone is 
registered in one state, she works in a second state, and she routinely travels through a third 
state (using CMRS towers in  state one or state two).  The challenge facing the FCC is that the 
Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  arguably  places  all  interconnection  arrangements, 
including those  of CMRS  and LECs,  in the hands of states.  If the FCC  adopts this 
interpretation of the statute, then it will have to choose one of the first two options outlined 
above. 
3.22.  Cable 
The  experience  of federal  pre-emption in the cable  area has  been far  less  successful, 
primarily because the FCC misjudged the degree to which competition could be trusted to 
supplant regulation of cable rates. 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.85  Its goal was to 
encourage the growth of cable systems, the development of cable services, and the provision 
of diverse sources of information.  To do this, it sought to promote competition in cable 
communications  and  minimise  unnecessary  regulation  that  would  impose  an  undue 
economic burden on cable systems.86  In part, the 1984 Cable Act enhanced state and local 
authority by requiring all cable operators to obtain local franchises and permitting state law 
to determine the procedures that would be used in this respect.  87  In more fundamental 
respects, however, the law trumped state and local authority.  First, the 1984 Cable Act pre-
empted state and local authorities'  rate regulation of those cable systems that the FCC 
determined faced "effective competition."  A cable system was deemed subject to such 
effective competition if its subscribers could receive three over-the-air television signals. 
83  See H.R. Rep. No. 111, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1993); S. Rep. No. 36, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1993). 
84  The FCC recently decided that States have authority over LEC interconnection charges to CMRS providers.  See 
Petition On Behalf Of The Louisiana Public Service Comm'n For Authority To Retain Existing Jurisdiction Over 
Commercial Mobile Service Offered Within The State Of Louisiana, 10 FCC Red. 7898 (1995).  This decision has 
been criticised as an unwise diminution of FCC authority in the context of a dispute that was not a subject of broad 
industry or public comment.  If it stands, the same transaction (negotiation of rates for interconnection) between 
LECs and CMRS providers will be regulated at two different levels.  Such a system would encourage #regulatory 
arbitrage" in which parties attempt to play the federal rules on one side of an arrangement against the state rules 
on the other side of the same arrangement. 
ss  Pub. L. No. 98-549,98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (the "1984 Cable Act"). 
86  See  Rate  Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating  to the Provision of Cable Television Services, 
Report on Competition, 5 FCC Red. 4962 (1990). 
87  See47U.S.C. I  541. 
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This standard effectively abolished rate regulation for almost all cable systems.ss  Second, 
the 1984  Cable Act provided for  a  franchise 
11 renewal expectancy"  for  incumbent cable 
systems.  As a result, local authorities faced daunting procedural obstacles before they could 
terminate or refuse to renew a franchise. 
Whereas increased  competition and technological  advances  had consistently  prompted 
federal pre-emption in the telephony area, the 1984 Cable Act freed the cable industry from 
regulation while it was also free from competitive market forces.  Meaningful competition 
did not exist when Congress passed the 1984  Cable Act, and the provisions in the Act 
prevented it from developing.  As a consequence, the cable industry was, in essence, an 
unregulated monopoly.  Thus, in pre-empting state regulation without replacing it with 
adequate federal regulation, Congress mis-stepped.  As a result, though investment in cable 
programming increased  dramatically,  cable  rates  skyrocketed and competition faltered. 
Data collected for Congress in 1992 showed that monthly rates for the lowest priced basic 
cable  service  had increased  by 40%  or  more  for  28%  of cable  television  subscribers. 
Although the average number of basic channels had increased from about 24 to 30, average 
monthly rates had increased by 29%  during the same period.  The average monthly cable 
rate had increased almost three times as much as inflation.  In addition, due to the expense 
of building a cable system and local franchise restrictions, incumbent cable systems faced 
very little competition.89 
Congress enacted the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 199290 
to remedy the situation.  The 1992  Cable  Act imposed federal  rate regulation on most 
systems by redefining 
11 effective competition." As a result, a cable system would only be 
exempt from rate regulation if there was significant competition from other multichannel 
video programming distributors.91  To promote the development of competition, the 1992 
Cable Act both diminished and increased the role of the local franchising authority.  It 
prohibited them from granting an exclusive franchise or unreasonably refusing to award a 
competitive franchise, thus constricting their gatekeeping function.  On the other hand, local 
franchising  authorities became responsible for  policing cable  systems'  compliance with 
FCC-set rates. 
ss  Between 1986 and 1992, 97%  of all franchises were deregulated.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, H.R. Rep. No. 102-862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
89  See id. 
90  Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (the ''1992 Cable Act"). 
91  Under the 1992 Cable Act, a cable system experiences effective competition if: 
60 
•  its subscribers number fewer than 30% of the households in the franchise area; 
•  the franchise area is served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel video programming distributors, each of 
which offers comparable programming to at least 50%  of the households and the number of households 
subscribing to programming services offered by all but the largest distributor exceeds 15% of the total; or 
•  the franchising authority's distributor offers video programming to at least 50% of the households. 
In addition, the 1992 Cable Act requires vertically integrated programmers to make their programming available 
to competitors.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 alters the "effective competition" test, as discussed below. Appendix 7: Federalism in United States Telecommunications 
4.  The Federalism of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Mter more than two years of debate, Congress in February passed the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act'').92  The 1996 Act seeks "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-
regulatory  national  policy  framework"  designed  to. make  available  to  all  Americans 
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services "by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition."93  In embodying the hope that competition 
will substitute for regulation,  the 1996 Act takes a leap in the direction in which the FCC 
has been moving since  the late 1960's.  In so doing,  it exaggerates  the trend  toward 
increased federal power that the FCC's previous actions had started and that generally 
accompanies advancing and converging technologies.  The FCC will initiate a large number 
of proceedings in the coming year to implement the 1996 Act; many of these will implicate 
state and federal relations and state regulators (as well as the incumbent interests with 
which they tend to ally)  will no doubt attempt to narrow any additional allocation of 
authority to the FCC. 
Before addressing the changes the 1996 Act effects in the state and federal balance of power, 
the following outlines the four core principles that shaped the 1996 Act: 
•  Simultaneous Entry into Competing Lines of Business. The 1996 Act is designed to 
allow RBOCs  to enter the long distance business when competitors can enter the 
RBOCs local markets.  It is also designed to permit cable, long distance and other 
companies to offer telephony services at approximately the same time and to allow 
telephone and cable companies into each other's respective spheres simultaneously. 
This  desire  for  simultaneous  entry  comprehends  the  importance  of  timing 
deregulation,  competition,  and  federalisation  that the  CMRS/cable  example  in 
Section 3 explored. 
•  Level Playing Field.  The 1996 Act imposes restrictions on certain activities (e.g., 
joint marketing, toll dialling parity, video program access) on new entrants that have 
been  imposed  on  incumbents  to  ensure  that  the  rules  of  engagement  in  the 
competitive fight are the same.  In some instances, the new entrant's lack of market 
power may render the rules wholly without policy justification.  In such cases, the 
appearance of equal treatment may belie its reality. 
•  Removal  of Restrictions  on Competition.  In the broadcast area,  the 1996  Act 
removes cross ownership restrictions and increases the number of stations a single 
person may own.  In the telephone area,  the 1996  Act does what the EU Open 
Network  Provision  and  Services  Directives  intend  to  do by  pre-empting  state 
barriers  to  local  telephone  competition  and  allowing  utilities  to  enter  into 
telecommunications.  The 1996 Act also repeals the prohibition, already struck down 
92  Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
93  S. Conf. Rep. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1996). 
61 Creation of a European Regulatory Authority  n;e;r;a 
by a number of federal courts, on the entry of cable and telephone companies into 
each other's businesses. 
•  Relaxation of Regulations.  Cable companies,  local  telephone companies, some 
wireless-cable companies,-broadcasters; and· others will be subject to less regulation. 
However, the RBOCs are subjected to new regulations in the form of open access 
and separate affiliate requirements. 
In setting up the process for implementing these core principles, Congress reflected the tug 
of the federal/  state duality.  Two areas best illustrate this ongoing tension:  local telephone 
competition and multichannel video competition. 
4.1.  Telephony 
When the 1996 Act was passed, many states had laws flatly prohibiting local telephone 
competition.  Those laws were erased.  When the 1996 Act was passed, several states had 
numerous and intimidating hurdles new entrants had to overcome before they could offer 
service.  Those hurdles were removed.94  When the 1996  Act was passed, many states 
required local telephone companies to impose high fees on companies connecting to their 
networks.  Mechanisms have been put in place to reduce those fees.9S  When the 1996 Act 
was passed, RBOCs  were not permitted into the long distance market  They now are, 
immediately in areas outside their local markets and within their local markets once these 
are sufficiently competitive.  96  But the 1996 Act did not airbrush states out of the picture 
altogether.  Rather, the Act provides that within this broad federal framework - no barriers 
to  entry,  mandated  access,  cost-based  rates  - states  retain  authority  to  regulate  the 
particular agreements incumbent and competing carriers reach on access to the network.  97 
With respect to RBOC entry into the long distance business, the 1996 Act establishes a 14-
9f  Section 253 of the 1996 Act substantially reduces the compass of states to regulate telecommunications.  It removes 
all state and local barriers to the entry of competing telecommunications services providers. Thus, no state or local 





As part of the push towards competition, the 1996 Act, at Section 251, contains a general duty of interconnection 
for all carriers and expanded interconnection obligations for LECs (e.g., resale, number portability, dialling parity, 
and access to rights--of-way).  Incumbent LECs face additional obligations to negotiate interconnection agreements 
in  good  faith,  to  provide  access  to  network  elements  on  an  unbundled  basis,  and  to  offer  resale  of 
telecommunications services at wholesale rates.  Carriers may voluntarily negotiate interconnection agreements, 
under Section 252, but are required to submit these agreements to the state commissions for approval.  The FCC 
has authority to act where a state fails to. 
Section 271 establishes a procedure for permitting RBOC entry into the long distance business. 
States still may impose certain limited  conditions on providers,  especially  to protect consumers,  and local 
governments may manage their rights--of-way on a non-discriminatory basis.  However, the FCC may pre-empt 
any state or local requirement that violates or is inconsistent with Section 253.  With respect to interconnection 
obligations, Section 252 provides that state commissions will be responsible for resolving interconnection disputes 
according to enumerated standards and for setting interconnection prices for each network element.  State access 
regulations may remain in effect if they are consistent with Section 251.  States also have role in modifying or 
suspending interconnection requirements for very small carriers or for rural carriers. Appendix 7: Federalism in United States Telecommunications 
point "competitive checklist'' an RBOC must satisfy before it can compete, but the states are 
responsible for determining when that checklist has been satisfied. 
The 1996 Act addresses the provision of universal service, historically governed by both 
federal and-- state regulations· and--long· a· souree-of tension between the two spheres.  It 
creates, in Section 254, a federal-state Joint Board to review and recommend a policy on 
universal service.98  Universal service is defined as an evolving level of telecommunications 
services and the FCC is charged with periodically establishing what components are: 
•  essential to educational goals or public health and safety; 
•  have been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers; or 
•  are being deployed in  public networks. 
State authority is specifically  preserved under Section 254  and a  state may adopt any 
measure with respect to universal service that is not inconsistent with the FCC's rules.  The 
state is charged with determining how much all providers of intrastate telecommunications 
should contribute  to  universal service  within that state.  It may also  adopt additional 
requirements with respect to universal service. 
In this way,  the 1996  Act  sets  out the broad federal  policy,  and prohibits states from 
enforcing certain anti-competitive laws, but allows states to administer the details of the 
new federal policy so long as the states remain true to the goals of the 1996 Act. 
4.2.  Multichannel Video 
Congress used a similar approach in writing the law affecting the ability of consumers to 
receive competing forms  of video distribution.  Here, too,  it is apparent that new and 
converging technologies serve to spur the federalisation of telecommunications regulations, 
but that states retain a role in policing and implementing the federal vision.  The 1996 Act, 
Section 207, establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction over direct-to-home satellite services 
and pre-empts local regulation that impairs reception by antennas used in these services. 
Ten  years  ago,  the  FCC  adopted  a  rule  pre-empting  local  ordinances  that  imposed 
unreasonable limitations on the reception of satellite-services.  99  Prior to the passage of the 
1996 Act, the FCC initiated a proceeding making it easier for the FCC to adjudicate local 
zoning  disputes,  preventing states  from  regulating satellite  antennas,  and establishing 
presumptions that states cannot regulate small antennas (such as DBS 1-m dishes and VSAT 
2-m dishes). 
98  For background on universal senrice regulation and federal-state joint boards, see WCP at  64-66. 
99  In re Pre-emption of Local Zoning or Other Regulation of Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 51 Fed. Reg. 5519 
(1986). 
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Last month, the FCC issued a Report and Order on this subject and tentatively concluded 
that this decision satisfied the requirements of the 1996 Act.  too  As in its earlier pre-emption 
decisions, the Commission justified its expansion of federal pre-emption in the name of its 
Section 1 duty to ensure Americans' access to an efficient network.  It balanced ''the very 
weighty and important interests of state and local governments in managing land use in 
their communities ....  [against] the federal interest in ensuring easy access to satellite-
delivered services, which have become increasingly important and widespread in the last 
few years and are dependent upon rapid and inexpensive antenna installation by businesses 
and  consumers."tm  As  proof  of  how  controversial  pre-emption  decisions  remain, 
immediately after the FCC decision was released, a group of mayors held a news conference 
outside the FCC protesting what they called ''unprecedented intrusion" of the FCC into 
local zoning, building codes and other local controls over satellite dish placement.t02 
Just as Congress bet on competition to deregulate and federalise mobile telephony, so it is 
betting on competition in the multichannel video area to enable deregulation of hard-wire 
cable.  Here too, the trend towards federalisation is strong.  The 1996 Act, at Section 301, 
eliminates rate regulation for small cable systems immediately.  To give cable companies 
certainty, it terminates rate regulation in all circumstances by March 1999.  Prior to that 
moratorium, the 1996 Act provides for the deregulation of basic and cable programming 
service tiers in franchise areas that have 
11 effective competition."  The FCC has come to a 
tentative decision, under Congress'  guidance, about what the new test for  determining 
whether or not there is II  effective competition" should be, in addition to the tests provided 
in the 1992  Cable Act.  This  is  whether an LEC  or multichannel video programming 
distributor offers video programming services of at least 12 channels to subscribers, at least 
some  of  which are  local  broadcasting signals  - a  test  that will result in rapid rate 
deregulation.t03 
The 1996 Act, at Section 302, also permits LECs to provide multichannel video services on a 
common carrier basis (meaning provision of transmission facilities on a non-discriminatory 
basis)  or on an open video system (i.e.,  subject to non-discrimination requirements and 
requirements that the operator not favour its own programming when system capacity is 
scarce).  Open video systems are subject to reduced regulation, although local franchising 
authorities and states may impose fees on them.  Section 303 of the 1996 Act pre-empts local 
franchising authority regulation of telecommunications services, including those provided 
by cable systems.  Thus, if an operator is offering telephony or other telecommunications 
services, it will be subject to applicable state and federal regulations only, but not to the 
local authorities. 
100  In re Pre-emption of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations, FCC No. 96--78 (March 11, 1996). 
101  ld. 
102  Communications Daily, April3, 1996, at 7. 
103  In re Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC No. 96--154 
(April9, 1996). 
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After the 1996 Act, the distribution of federal and state authority with respect to cable is 
essentially unchanged.  Cable systems must obtain local franchises and the local authorities 
are responsible for policing federally-set rates.  However, the creation of open video systems 
under an essentially federal regime bodes for a larger federal presence in the multichannel 
video sector as a whole. 
5.  Human Resources of the FCC 
5.1.  FCC Staff  Numbers 
As of 1995, the FCC staff numbered 2,271, which is about the same as what it was in 1980.104 
In 1993, the FCC had only 1,724 employees.  The increase came·in 1994, when Congress 
appropriated additional funding so that the FCC could finally implement the Cable Act of 
1992. 
In 1994,  under the direction of the newly appointed Chairman Reed  Hundt, the  FCC 
initiated a reorganisation to better implement the 1992 Cable Act and to respond to the 
Clinton Administration's Reinventing Government initiative. 
Some bureaus changed their names.  Cable television issues were removed from the Mass 
Media Bureau and placed in the new Cable Services Bureau.  A Competition Division 
(consisting of 13 lawyers and four economists) was added to the General Counsel's office 
(consisting of the adjudication, administrative law, and litigation divisions) to write rules to 
promote competition.  The legal staff grew across the FCC to remedy the FCC's poor record 
in the courts.  Finally, people were hired to augment the FCC's mix of skills and help usher 
in  competition  (e.g.  economists,  MBAs,  computer  industry  experts  and  experienced 
technical people and managers from the telecommunications industry). 
As of 1995, full time employees were distributed among the FCC Bureaus and Offices as 
follows: 
•  in Compliance and Information Bureau (formerly Field Operations Bureau); 
•  in Mass Media Bureau; 
•  in Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (replacing the Private Radio Bureau); 
•  in Common Carrier Bureau; 
104  This plateau is notable considering the substantial increase in the FCC's workload over the same period.  Tariff 
filings increased from 1,821  (16,817 pages) in 1981  to 5,573  (264,640  pages) in 1994 - a 16-fold increase in the 
number of pages.  Consumer inquiries to the FCC's Office of Public Affairs doubled between 1990 and 1994 (from 
84,587 to 163,757) as did the number of Congress inquiry letters to the FCC (from 3,445 to 6,368). 
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•  in Office of Managing Director; 
•  in Cable services Bureau (newly created); 
•  in  International Bureau; 
•  in  Office of Engineering and Technology; 
•  in  Office of Public Mfairs; 
•  in  the Offices of the Commissioners and Chairman; 
•  in  Office of Plans and Policy; 
•  in Administrative Law Judges; 
•  in Office of Communication Business Opportunities (formerly the Office of Small 
Business Activities within the Office of Managing Director); 
•  in Review Board; 
•  in  Office of Inspector General; 
•  in Office of Workplace Diversity (newly created). 
As of 1995, staff distribution was as follows: 28% in enforcement; 19.8% in authorisation of 
service; 13.9%  in executive director/administrative support; 18.3%  in policy/rulemaking; 
12.7% in public information service; 4.4% in legal services; 2.9% in  international activities. 
The Common Carrier Bureau provides one example of a single bureau's professional staff 
breakdown.  It has a total of 190 professionals to deal with 1,200 telephone companies, the 
RBOCs, competitive access providers and long distance companies.  These professionals are 
distributed as follows: 
•  17 doing primarily policy work; 
•  164 in operations (managing tariffs, universal service, network reliability, complaints 
and consumer protection functions); 
•  9 in  management. 
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5.2.  Roles of  FCC Staff  Members 
The FCC is designed to react to the market information that regulated industries, the public, 
research and policy organisations, and other governmental entities give it.  The notice and 
comment  process,  like  the  EU  consultation  procedure,  requires  the  regulator  to  put 
questions  to  the  public  and  then  act  on  the  basis  of  the  responses.  Supplemental 
information generated by the  FCC  may help  to  shape  a  given notice  of inquiry and 
detel'llrine what questions the FCC  asks, but final decisions must be made on a  record 
consisting largely of public comment. 
That  said,  both  the  FCC  and  the  National  Telecommunications  and  Information 
Administration  (NTIA)  - an  executive-branch  agency  located  within  the  Commerce 
Department - have methods to monitor market developments and augment the regulators' 
information base. 
•  The FCC employs about 55 economists who analyse the economic effects of rules and 
other FCC decisions presumably using actual market date as appropriate. 
•  The FCC Office Of Plans and Policy (OPP) exists as a quasi think-tank within the 
FCC.  Issues are referred to it for analysis based on economic, business and legal 
expertise.  In  addition,  OPP  produces  reports  on  trends  and  discrete  market 
developments in telecommunications (usually related to a pending FCC proceeding). 
•  At least three of the FCC Bureaus have internal policy divisions that can be expected 
to  monitor  the  market;  the  Common  Carrier  Bureau's  Policy  and  Programme 
Planning Division;  the Mass  Media Bureau's Policy  and Rules  Division;  and the 
Office of General Counsel's Competition Division. 
•  The  NTIA  was formed in 1978  (from two predecessor organisations)  to manage 
government spectrum and to detel'llrine presidential policy on telecommunication 
issues.  With respect to the latter duty, the NTIA has a substantial research staff.  It 
publishes extensive  technical reports as well as economic and policy studies on 
telecommunications issues.  It frequently develops regulatory proposals and submits 
expert comments in FCC proceedings.  Many of these activities require the synthesis 
and analysis of market data 
6.  Conclusion 
The course of US telecommunications regulation has been one of increasing federalisation. 
This trend has both precipitated and been formed by technological advances, convergence, and 
increased competition.  How  precipitated?  Because the FCC  and Congress· have tended to 
,  favour  competition  more  strongly  than have  the  states,  which  have  had  interests  in 
protecting incumbents and subsidising basic residential service.  In some cases this has not 
been the case and there has been great value in local laboratories demonstrating exemplary 
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policy  choices.  How  formed  by  the  changes  in  telecommunications?  The  integration and 
growing complexity of the interstate network has demanded federal coordination.  Of 
course, growing competition and diminishing monopoly power tend to mitigate increased 
federal  control by lightening the federal presence even as that presence spreads.  The 
American experience shows that the timing of deregulation and federalisation must be 
approached carefully.  There is a danger that if regulators and legislators federalise and 
deregulate too quickly, before there is sufficient competition, there will be higher consumer 
prices and reduced competition.  This was the case in the US in the mid-1980s with cable 
television.  On the contrary, properly pacing deregulation and federalisation with increasing 
competition may enable new and affordable technologies to emerge.  This was the case in 
the US in the mid-1990s with digital wireless telephony and it is the hoped for result of the 
1996 Act. 
Another lesson to emerge from the US experience with dual state and federal authority is 
that the trend toward federalisation is not absolute.  The retraction from a  very broad 
federal pre-emption authority in 1986, under Louisiana PSC is one example.  As technology 
advances and it becomes easier to separate interstate and intrastate traffic, the predicates for 
pre-emption that Louisiana PSC establishes may be met less frequently and, thus, federal 
pre-emption  may  be  subject  to  more  court  challenges.  What  has  been  called  the 
"schizophrenic" quality of the 1996 Act with respect to federal/  state jurisdiction is another 
example.  Undoubtedly, the removal of state barriers to competition in the local markets is a 
significant incursion on state power.  However, among the most important provisions of the 
1996 Act are those that deal with interconnection, which endow the states with a significant 
role.  There  are  federal  requirements  for  interconnection  that  are  meant  to  foster 
competition.  But interconnection agreements must be submitted to and mediated by the 
states and it  is they that have first crack at determining the shape of competition to come. 
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APPENDIX 8.  SUBSIDIARITY UNDER RECENT PROPOSALS 
As stated in Section 4.2.2a of the Main Report, the Community must satisfy the subsidiarity 
test before it can exercise.powers.conferred on it by the EC Treaty in areas where it shares 
competence to act with Member States.  It is helpful, therefore, when considering if the 
Community has the authority to create a European Regulatory Authority, to look at how 
recent proposals in the telecommunications sector have dealt with-the subsidiarity issue. 
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Licensing Proposal stipulates that, in line  with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the granting of authorisations is the responsibility of Member States 
and that the choice of whether they are granted through one or more documents, or given by 
one or more national/  regional/local authorities, is to remain a matter for Member States. 
It is clear that, if  a European Regulatory Authority is to be formed and assume a licensing role, 
at least in relation to trans-European networks, Member States must accept that present goal 
posts on subsidiarity need to be moved. In this context the 29th recital of the Full Competition 
Directive (96/19/EC), as set out below, is important 
In the second Recital, reference is made to Council Resolution of 18 September 1995 on the 
implementation of the future regulatory framework for telecommunications (OJ C258  of 3 
October 1995), which recognises as a key factor for a future telecoms regulatory framework the 
establishment, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, of common principles for 
general authorisations and individual. licensing regimes in the Member States. 
The Explanatory  Memorandum of  the Interconnection Proposal states  that the proposed 
harmonised framework for interconnection will be characterised by clear responsibilities for 
national regulatory authorities, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity; and that a 
European Community Directive is considered to be the most effective way of laying down the 
principles for interconnection in Member States while at the same time defining the role of 
national regulatory authorities consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. 
In the 22nd Recital of the Interconnection Proposal, Article 3b(2) EC is almost literally quoted 
to the effect that the essential goal of interconnection of networks and services throughout the 
European Union and the provision  of trans-European networks and services  cannot be 
satisfactorily realised at Member State level, and is better achieved at European Union level by 
the adoption of this Directive. 
The 29th Recital of the Full Competition Directive states that responsibility for measures to 
support the transition process to a  fully liberalised telecoms environment rests mainly at 
Member State level. 
The 30th Recital goes on importantly to state that the establishment of procedures at national 
level concerning licensing, interconnection, universal service, numbering and rights of way is 
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without prejudice to their harmonisation by appropriate European Parliament and Council 
legislative instruments. 
This language appears to pave the way for  possible further Community measures in the 
sector. 
Finally, a common position has now been adopted by the EU Council of Ministers in relation 
to  the ONP Framework Directive.  This guarantees the independence of NRAs,  but also 
promotes  genuine structural  separation between regulatory  activities  and other activities 
linked to ownership or supervision.  The Council of Ministers has therefore re-asserted the 
continuing need for strong regulation at  national level. 
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APPENDIX 9.  THE PROPOSED COMMUNITY POSITION ON 
LICENSING AND INTERCONNECTION 
1.  Introduction 
Commission  Directive  96/19  /EC amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with regard  to  the 
implementation of  full competition  in telecommunications  markets · ("Full  Competition 
Directive")  represents  the  final  leg  of  the  EU'  s  journey  to  full  liberalisation  of  the 
telecommunications industry. The Member States have (with certain exceptions) committed 
themselves  to  opening  every  market  for  telecommunication  services  (voice,  mobile, 
satellite), and permitting the establishment and provision of infrastructure, at the start of 
1998.  The Directive also allows alternative infrastructure  to be used for services that are 
already liberalised (that is everything but public voice telephony). 
2.  Licensing 
As  a  half-way  house to  a  Community licence,  two previous attempts were  made to 
introduce mutual recognition of licensing of servicestos.  Both proposals were subsequently 
withdrawn, however, and recently replaced by a new proposal: the Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on a common framework for general authorisations and 
individual licences in the field of telecommunications services ("the Licensing Directive")106. 
The Licensing Directive was first introduced by the Commission in 1995, and was amended 
following the Parliament's first reading of the Directive1o1.  In December 1996, a Common 
Position was reachedlOS. 
It is, however, instructive to look back to the thinking behind two superseded Proposals in 
order to put the Licensing Directive in context and to evaluate how the issues of subsidiarity 
and comitology have impacted regulation in this area. 
It was  argued  in  the  Services  Proposal  that  the  need  to  obtain  separate  licences  or 
authorisations in Member States was inimical to a true single market, time consuming and a 
tos  The Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the mutual recognition of licences 
and other national authorisations for telecommunications services (COM (92) 254) as amended by (COM (94) 41) 
(''the  Services Proposal") and the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a policy for the 
mutual recognition of licences and other national authorisations for the provision of satellite network services 
and/  or satellite communications services (COM (93) 652) ("the Satellite Proposal") 
t06  COM(95)545. 
107  Amended Proposal for  a  European  Parliament and Council Directive on a  common framework for  general 
authorizations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications, COM (96)342. 
t~m  Common Position (EC) No 7/97 adopted by the Council on 9 December 1996 with a view to adopting Directive 
97 I ...  /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  ...  , on a framework for general authorizations and 
individual licences in the field of telecommunications services. 
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barrier  to  entry.  The  Services  Proposal  therefore  introduced  the  concept of a  Single 
European Telecommunications Licence which, subsequently, was replaced by a watered-
down procedure for mutual recognition of national authorisations, under a simplified and 
more  efficient  procedure  based  on  prior  harmonisation  of  national  conditions  for 
authorisation of telecommunication services (or, in some cases, even absent harmonisation). 
One-stop  shopping  procedures  were  also  to  be  promoted  as  a  transitional  measure, 
regulated by ECTRA or under Molls between NRAs where harmonisation of conditions 
was incomplete. 
The Council justified action at Community level on the basis that Community action was 
required to establish an internal market in telecommunications services  which, in tum, 
requires a harmonisation of licensing conditions.  The Commission stated that licensing 
itself would remain the prerogative of Member States. 
Similarly, the Satellite Proposal aimed for mutual recognition of licensing on the basis of 
harmonised national conditions for authorisation of satellite services by service categories; 
and it provided for mutual recognition of licences for certain categories of services without 
prior harmonisation where that did not seem required. 
Both Proposals envisaged the creation of a Community Telecommunications Committee, 
but there was debate over the role  of this Committee.  The  Proposals  stated that the 
Committee was to have an advisory role, leaving final decision-making power in the hands 
of the Commission.  The Economic and Social Committee, by contrast, recommended that 
the Committee should have greater regulatory powers, but the Commission resisted this. 
Although NRAs would, in general, have retained the right to issue, monitor and enforce 
licences to provide telecommunications services, both Proposals contained powers for the 
Commission, in certain cases, to overturn national licensing decisions.  This caused concern 
among Member States, and these powers are not replicated in the Common Position on the 
Licensing Directive. 
The main difference between the Licensing Directive and the two withdrawn Proposals is 
that the Community has moved away from the idea of mutual recognition of licences, and 
consequently further away from pan-European licensing, in favour of harmonised national 
procedures for the granting of authorisations and the conditions attached to authorisations. 
To promote deregulation, the Commission also promotes the grant of general authorisations 
by Member States, thus removing the need for individual national licences in many cases. 
The  new  proposed  Licensing  Directive  does,  however,  retain  certain  elements  of the 
previous  Proposals:  in  particular,  it  requires  that  ECTRA  and  ERC/ERO  develop 
harmonised licence  conditions  and that a  one-stop  shopping procedure for  individual 
licences be set up to assist undertakings to provide trans-European services.  The procedure 
may, if fully implemented,  facilitate simultaneous delivery of individual national licences 
following a single application. 
72 Appendix 9: The Proposed Community Position on Licensing and Interconnection 
In a parallel development, on one-stop shopping, ETO has, since 1995, set up a type of on-
stop shopping regime envisaged by the Licensing Directive, but only in respect of data 
transmission and value added services. 
A further feature of the original Proposal was that, under Article 13, operators intending to 
operate in more than one Member State may request the relevant NRAs to coordinate their 
authorisation procedures in order to ensure that they issue the necessary authorisations on 
substantially the same conditions, but this provision was removed in the Common Position. 
A Common Position was reached on 9 December 1996 under which the use of individual 
licences is limited in Article 7 to: 
•  allowing access to radio frequencies or numbers; 
•  granting licensees particular rights with regard to access to public or private land; 
•  imposing  obligation  and  requirements  relating  to  the  mandatory  provision  of 
publicly available Member State services and/  or public Member State networks, 
including obligations under ONP legislation and/  or relating to universal service 
provision; 
•  imposing specific obligations related to competition rules on players with significant 
market power in relation to publicly available Member State services and/  or public 
Member State networks. 
Additionally, individual licences may be used in relation to the provision of voice telephony 
services, the establishment and provision of public Member State networks and of other 
networks involving radio-frequencies. 
Furthermore, according to Article 10(1),  the number of licences  may be limited for  any 
category of services or for the establishment and operation of networks "only to the extent 
required to ensure the efficient use of radio frequencies or for the time necessary to make 
available  sufficient numbers in accordance with Community law''.  Where licensing is 
required, NRAs are put under stringent obligations and a new Licensing Committee is to be 
set up comprising representatives of Member States in order to assist the Commission to 
monitor the application of the Licensing Directive and to promote exchanges of information. 
Another recent development in the field of licensing was the discussion in Council on 21 
March 1996 of a proposal by the Commission to introduce S-PCS in the EU in a coordinated 
fashiont09.  A key issue was the need for action at Community level in this area, partly on 
109  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on an action at a Union level in the field of satellite 
personal communications services in the European Union;  COM (95) 529. 
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the grounds that coordination on frequency allocation and licensing already takes place via 
organisations like the ITU and the CEPT.  Most of the Member States rejected provisions in 
the  proposal  allowing  the  Commission,  together  with  a  Committee  of  Member  State 
representatives,  to  develop  criteria  for  licensing  operators  for  the  EU  market and for 
selecting the operators, which suggests political concern over a perceived expansion of the 
role of the Commission in the area of licensing and, accordingly,  that the subsidiarity 
argument could be deployed against further pre-emption in this area.  J 
On 27 September, Council reach agreement on a Common Position which authorised the 
Commission to act though the CEPf framework to harmonise the use of frequencies and the 
conditions for granting general authorisations for SPCS; a brief defines a specific task to be 
performed and a timetable.  At the conclusion of the process, the Commission will submit 
proposals  to  the  Licensing  Committee  mentioned  above,  but the  Commission  or any 
Member State will have a right to appeal earlier to the Licensing Committee if  it considers 
that negotiations are not progressing satisfactorily. 
On 9 December 1996, a Common Position was adopted by the Council with a view to the 
adoption of Decision No ...  /97  /EC of the ...  European Parliament and of the Council on a 
coordinated authorization approach in the field of satellite personal communication services 
in the Community." 
3.  Interconnection 
The  ONP Voice  Telephony Directive  (95/62)  sets out conditions for  interconnection in 
defined circumstances, particularly with regard to the provision of voice telephony services. 
It also  defines  the powers and rights of national regulatory authorities with regard to 
interconnection with the voice network and requirements for cost-oriented pricing and for 
cost accounting for certain operators. 
The Interconnection Directiveno lays down harmonised principles for interconnection which 
are,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  proportionality  and  subsidiarity,  to  be 
implemented  at  a  national  level.  According  to  the  Directive,  in  order  to  promote 
Community-wide telecoms services,  there is a  need to  ensure interconnection of public 
networks and interconnection between different national and Community operators and 
ONP  measures  provide  an  appropriate  framework  for  harmonising  interconnection 
conditions.  Hence,  Article  6  of the Interconnection  Directive  lays  down principles  to 
guarantee transparency, access to information, non-discrimination and equality of access, in 
particular for organisations with significant market power (generally, an organisation with a 
share of more than 25%  of a  particular telecoms  market in the geographical area in a 
Member State within which it is authorised to operate). 
11°  Common Position (Eq No 34/96 adopted by the Council on 18 June 1996 with a view to adopting Directive 96/ 
/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to 
ensuring  universal  service  and interoperability  through  the  application  of the  principles  of open network 
provision (ONP), OJ C220, 29.7.96. 
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The basis of the Interconnection Directive is that any existing barriers to interconnection be 
removed by Member States, and that authorised network and service providers should be 
free to negotiate interconnection agreements on a commercial basis in accordance with EC 
law, subject to superoisionand interoention.by NRAs.- NRAs are to retain an important role in 
encouraging the development of a competitive market in the interests of European users, 
and in securing adequate interconnection of networks and services  . 
Negotiation of interconnection agreements may be facilitated by NRAs setting down certain 
conditions  in  advance,  and  identifying  other  areas  to  be  covered  in  interconnection 
agreements. In the event of a  dispute over interconnection between parties in the same 
Member State, an aggrieved party must be able to call on the NRA concerned to resolve the 
dispute. NRAs must be able to require organisations to interconnect their facilities, where it 
can be demonstrated that this is in the users' interests. 
Also of particular interest are Articles 9, 13, 15 and 16.  Article 9 defines in some detail the 
general responsibilities of NRAs and includes the requirement that, in relation to prescribed 
organisations (generally the major service or network providers), the NRAs shall, inter alia, 
set certain listed ex ante conditions, including a dispute resolution procedure, requirements 
for  the provision of equal access and number portability, and requirements to  provide 
facility sharing, including collocation.  NRAs shall also encourage certain listed issues to be 
included in interconnection agreements, such as a description of interconnect services to be 
provided and technical standards for interconnection. 
Article  13  states  that  NRAs  shall  ensure  that  organisations  providing  public 
telecommunications networks or services take full account of standards referenced in the 
Official Journal as being suitable for the purpose of interconnection. In the absence of such 
standards, NRAs are to encourage the provision of technical interfaces for interconnection 
in accordance  with  a  prioritised  list  of  standards,  beginning  with  those  adopted  by 
European standardisation bodies  such as  ETSI.  Further,  in consultation with the ONP 
Committee, the Commission may request standards for interconnection and access to be 
drawn up, where appropriate, by European standardisation bodies. 
Article 15 and 16 provide for the ONP Committee to be involved in both an advisory role 
and a regulatory role in accordance with Council Directive 90/387  /EE011. 
111  Ibid. 
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